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Introduction
Mobilization is a concept underlying a diverse array of processes in society.From the turnout in elections and shows of support for a particular causeto political upheaval and the spread of violence – all of these dynamics are
based on influential behavior and interdependent decisions of individuals. This dis-
sertation sheds light on different forms and aspects of mobilization by theoretically,
methodologically and empirically advancing our knowledge of the concept.
Part I approaches the political economy of mobilization from a theoretical per-
spective against the background of current events. Chapter 1 starts out from the
observation, that numerous of western industrialized nations have experienced a
notable polarization of political ideologies in recent years, and that growing num-
bers of individuals seemingly support extreme positions. As a result, established
political parties have moved to the left or right and new parties have appeared on
the fringes. But why are people with extreme political views this visible in the public
debate, and how are they able to move party positions further to the margins when
they should be outnumbered by a moderate majority? Contradictory to the classic
literature that focuses on collective action problems, this chapter studies emerging
effects from informational asymmetries. It extends a spatial voting model to in-
clude incompletely informed candidates and knowledgeable voters. Agent-based
simulations suggest that only fringe voters benefit from distorting their opinions
and dominating political discourse. At the same time, better informed candidates
have a competitive advantage in elections no matter how strongly voters distort
their positions.
After this theoretical discussion of potential mechanisms behind the escalation
of extreme political opinions, the chapters in part II turn to a particular kind of mo-
bilization and examine the spread of right-wing violence. The recent rise of xeno-
phobic attacks against refugees in Germany has sparked both political and scholarly
debates about the drivers, dynamics, and consequences of right-wing violence. But
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a lack of systematic data collection and data processing has inhibited the quantita-
tive analysis to help explain this current social phenomenon. Chapter 2 therefore
introduces a new georeferenced event dataset on anti-refugee violence and social
unrest in Germany in 2014 and 2015 based on a public chronicle. The dataset in-
cludes information on 1 645 events of four different types of right-wing violence
and social unrest: xenophobic demonstrations, assault, arson attacks, and miscella-
neous attacks against refugee housing (such as swastika graffiti). After discussing
how the dataset was constructed, the chapter provides a descriptive analysis of pat-
terns of right-wing violence and unrest in Germany in 2014 and 2015.
Based on this dataset, chapter 3 offers an in-depth analysis of all recorded in-
stances of anti-refugee violence in order to answer the following questions: To what
extent can series of hate crimes be explained by contagion? To what extent are they
brought about by local conditions, including the level of support for right-wing
extremist political parties? Using standard non-spatial and spatio-temporal econo-
metric models, this chapter shows that hate crimes have a strong spill-over compo-
nent across different types of violence. Adopting an epidemiologic point process
model, this chapter also determines the contagiousness of each type of violence.
Taking up the notion from chapter 1 that public discourse is increasingly tak-
ing place within social media, part III considers possible approaches for analyzing
these oftentimes unstructured data sources appropriately. In order to look beyond
the opportunities of social media and investigate the precise mechanisms of online
mobilization, chapter 4 proposes a combination of automated content and network
analysis to examine determinants of successful online mobilization. This approach
is applied to the extended Twitter networks of organizations within the environ-
mental and nuclear disarmamentmovements to demonstrate its usefulness. Results
show that sentiment-laden messages receive widespread popularity, irrespective of
the messenger’s identity and role in the network. However, message content is sub-
ordinate to the centrality of a messenger when it comes to mobilizing more distant
network members.
In addition to its focus on different varieties and aspects ofmobilization, this dis-
sertation has another underlying theme that binds the individual chapters together:
Computational methods in the social sciences are being increasingly utilized and
also adopted from other disciplines to the effect that we can develop more complex
theories, analyze existing data in novel ways, and create entirely new data from
sources never considered before. Each of the subsequent chapters contributes to
this methodological diversity. Chapter 1 implements the spatial voting model in
an agent-based computational framework and uses simulations in order to recon-
3struct emerging global effects from individual behavior. Chapter 2 demonstrates
the usefulness of web-scraping and comprehensive data cleaning for collecting new
data and creating scientifically usable datasets. Chapter 3 adopts statistical tools
from epidemiology in order to gain new insights from spatio-temporal data. Fi-
nally, chapter 4 uses a combination of computational text analysis and graph theory
to explore the vast amounts of information within social networks.
The individual chapters of this dissertation are based on the following papers:
Chapter 1: Benček, D. (2016). Opportunistic Candidates and Knowledgeable Vo-
ters – A Recipe for Extreme Views. Under review.
Chapter 2: Benček, D. & Strasheim, J. (2016). Refugees welcome? A dataset on
anti-refugee violence in Germany. Research & Politics 3(4): 1–11.
Chapter 3: Benček, D.&Martin, C. (2016). Explaining hate crimes against refugees
in Germany: Contagion or local determinants? Under review.
Chapter 4: Benček, D. (2016). Message Received: AnalyzingDeterminants of SMO
Mobilization on Twitter. Under review.

Part I
A Theory of Extreme Views
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Chapter 1
Opportunistic Candidates and
Knowledgeable Voters – A Recipe
for Extreme Views
David Benček
1.1 Introduction
Recently, a number ofWestern industrialized nations have experienced a no-table polarization of political ideologies and growing numbers of individualsseemingly support extreme views on the left or right. Survey data among
US American adults, for instance, show a “growing ideological distance” between
parties as well as along educational and generational lines (Pew Research Center,
2014, 2016). Reacting to such shifts in preferences, established political parties have
moved considerably to the left or right, and new political parties have emerged –
and succeeded – on the fringes of policy space. The impact of Bernie Sanders and
his supporters on the US Democratic Party’s platform with regard to issues such
as the minimum wage or Wall Street reform, the rise of Donald Trump as the Re-
publican Party’s presidential candidate, but also the widespread emergence of anti-
immigration parties in Western Europe or the electoral successes of left-wing par-
ties inGreece, Portugal, or Spain are examples of these trends. It seems as if extreme
political views have become more prevalent in public discourse, have moved “from
the margins to the mainstream” (Lowles, 2015), and have considerably influenced
7
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the face of party systems for years to come. But why are people with extreme polit-
ical views this visible in the public debate, and how are fringe voters able to move
party positions to the extremes when they should be outnumbered by a moderate
majority?
This paper develops a spatial votingmodel built upon a classic Downsian frame-
work extended by incomplete information, heterogeneous candidates and knowl-
edgeable voters to show why fringe political views influence the political discourse
to the extent observed today. The motivation underlying this approach is twofold:
With such departures from the standardmodel this paper contributes to the theoret-
ical literature by accounting for empirical observations in the model’s assumptions.
As recent studies have highlighted, notable discrepancies exist between voter pref-
erences and candidate assessment of their constituency due to ideology or political
commitments (e.g. Enos & Hersh, 2015; Broockman & Skovron, 2015) and cogni-
tive heuristics (Miler, 2009).
Additionally, adopting an extended spatial voting model in order to compre-
hend widespread shifts in our political discourse can help trace the mechanisms
responsible for them. Of course, a common theoretical explanation of differences
between individual preferences and social outcomes is based on collective action
problems among the large majority of people holding moderate views (cf. Olson,
1965). What extremists lack in numbers they make up for by dominating public
discourse, while the moderate majority is trapped in a situation where no one feels
urged to proclaim their views. However, we live in a time of instantaneous unlim-
ited communication and a real-time feedback loop between politicians and their
constituency; opinion polls are being conducted constantly and statistical models
have become sophisticated and relatively accurate tools for predicting election out-
comes. In this environment, society is conspicuously aware of the interplay of pol-
itics and political interests; and voters have an adequate understanding of demo-
cratic processes. So if there were a collective action problem inhibiting moderate
views to challenge extreme opinions in public discourse, it would be identified and
internalized almost immediately. By incorporating knowledgeable voters in a spa-
tial voting framework the potential causes of discourse shifts are thus not subsumed
under the umbrella of collective action but can instead be traced along the mecha-
nisms at work.
Focusing on the combination of incompletely informed candidates and voters’
interest in affecting policy, this paper argues that only voters holding fringe political
views should have a justifiable interest in signalling their preferences distorted to-
wards evenmore extreme positions. Voters withmoderate political opinions do not
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benefit from similar signalling behavior due to the complex interplay of electoral
competition, multiple attempts at influence, and opportunistic candidate behavior
under incomplete information. Simulations of the model support this proposition
and further show that better informed candidates as well as stronger electoral com-
petition both mitigate such disparate behavioral incentives.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 briefly reviews the
relevant literature on the interplay between voter preferences and candidate per-
ceptions and behavior. Subsequently, section 1.3 presents a spatial voting model
with informational and behavioral frictions. The formal model is used to derive
the proposition that only fringe voters with preferred policies sufficiently far from
the center in an n-dimensional issue space benefit from signalling distorted opin-
ions, because only they can influence candidate platforms in the desired way. This
proposition is then examined in section 1.4 using an agent-based simulation imple-
mented in NetLogo. The simulation enables us to fully consider the implications of
heterogeneous agents and investigate different parameter constellations regarding
the informational capacity of candidates, electoral competition, and voter influence.
The final section concludes and identifies avenues for future research.
1.2 Background
The concept of spatial competition, starting out with Hotelling (1929) and Black
(1948), and popularized by Downs (1957), has produced a vast and diverse liter-
ature within the social sciences (e.g. Stokes, 1963; Eaton & Lipsey, 1975; Aoyagi
& Okabe, 1993). It has especially influenced theoretical research on party policy
strategies as well as empirical empirical studies of voting behavior (cf. Adams &
Merrill III, 2000). Most of this literature has focused on two particular issues: First,
the existence of stable or unstable equilibria in policy space under various circum-
stances and model assumptions has been the topic of numerous studies. For in-
stance, Lin, Enelow, andDorussen (1999) demonstrate that differences in equilibria
exist between deterministic and probabilistic multicandidate spatial voting models;
Schofield (2006) develops a spatial model with valence, in order to explain the gap
between theory and empirical observations regarding equilibria in voting models,
and derives general conditions under which local Nash equilibria exist in a multi-
party setting; and Banks andDuggan (2005) set up a basic and common framework
to unify large parts of the existing literature on probabilistic voting with two candi-
dates. They prove the existence of equilibria in pure andmixed strategies and relate
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them to social optima.
Second, the spatial voting framework has also been applied to the explanation
of variance in voter turnout: Plane and Gershtenson (2004) study voter alienation
in US mid-term elections and find that voter indifference and alienations explain
why voters abstain from casting their vote; and Geys (2006), in a meta-analysis of
83 studies on voter turnout, highlights in particular population size and election
closeness as explanations for why people turn out in elections.
A very common simplifying assumption in these studies is that of perfect in-
formation of either candidates, voters or both (see e.g. Shepsle & Weingast, 1984).
For instance, McKelvey and Patty (2006) use a Bayesian framework that includes
game-theoretic considerations for voters in order to model strategic voting – but
this implicitly assumes voters to have the capabilities to process lots of information.
Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson (1995, p. 559) are also optimistic about politicians’
ability to correctly assess preferences of their constituency and describe them as
“keen to pick up the faintest signals”. When testing the predictions of such spatial
voting models, the empirical literature takes these assumptions as given (see e.g.
Schofield, Sened, & Nixon, 1998).
But empirical studies have shown noteworthy discrepancies between the as-
sumptions underlying standard spatial voting models and actual candidate behav-
ior: Candidates have widespread and lastingmisperceptions about their constituen-
cies. Miller and Stokes (1963, p. 56) were the first to show empirically that repre-
sentatives have “very imperfect information about the issue preferences of [their]
constituency”. Several studies have also shown that politicians are more likely to
consider information coming from specific interest groups (Bartels, 2009; Hacker
& Pierson, 2010; DeCanio, 2005; Gilens, 2012). Similarly, Miler (2007) finds that
candidates do not assess information from all constituents, nor from the largest con-
stituencies, but rather from the most active and resource-rich constituents. There-
fore it is not surprising that according to Page, Bartels, and Seawright (2013) the
top 1 percent of US wealth-holders, which tends to be both more conservative and
more politically active than the rest of the population, has a higher impact on gov-
ernment policies than themajority of US citizens. Miler (2009) also studies the role
of incomplete or unrepresentative information in politicians’ judgement and sug-
gests the widepsread use of cognitive heuristics by decision-makers. Their effects
can be found in Enos and Hersh’s (2015) research who find political campaign staff
overly confident and note how this limits the benefits of electoral competition.
Sowhile there is abundant evidence of bounded rationality and the resulting sys-
tematic or incidental misperceptions, it is mostly the empirical literature account-
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ing for them. As a result, formal theoretical models neglect the complex properties
of established political systems which consist of a constant interplay of actors and
can thus exhibit emerging dynamics. This paper therefore develops a formal spatial
voting model that expands the standard framework with respect to three essential
aspects: First, candidates do not possess complete information about voter prefer-
ences. They can only consider a subset of opinions when choosing their policy plat-
form for elections. Second, candidates are heterogeneous with respect to the scope
of information they are able to take into account. As in real elections, some can-
didates are more experienced, have higher quality information or more resources
at their disposal, or are simply more interested in the preference structure of the
electorate. Some candidates thus choose their platform based on more voter infor-
mation than others. Lastly, voters in the proposed model are knowledgeable in the
sense that they are aware of how the democratic process functions. Voters know
that candidates try to win elections and do so by appealing to as large a share of the
electorate as possible. Consequently, voters are able to signal their preferences but
do not necessarily need to signal them thruthfully. The underlying rationale is to
influence the candidates’ perceptions and arrive at more favorable policy outcomes.
With these built-in informational and behavioral imperfections, the proposed
model is detached from the focus on equlibria and instead illustrates the complex
system dynamics of interdependent political behavior. The model allows for candi-
dates to be influenced by voters to varying degrees and conditional on the under-
lying preferences. The following section describes the properties and dynamics of
the model in more detail.
1.3 Model
The spatial voting model depicts the interaction of candidates and voters and the
ensuing dynamics in discrete time. For reasons of clarity and legibility, the time
subscript t is omitted in this exposition.
1.3.1 Basic Structure
Actors The proposed model accommodates two types of actors, candidates and
voters, who are scattered randomly across an n-dimensional, bounded policy space
Y  Rn according to some density function f cn() and f vn(), respectively.
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Each candidate j = 1; : : : ;M has a unique policy platform pj 2 Y , represented
by her position in policy space and p = (p1;    ; pM) is the vector of all candidate
platforms. Candidates attempt to win elections by choosing their platform in policy
space.
Each voter i = 1; : : : ; N has a stationary but not necessarily unique bliss point
bi 2 Y . Voters have single-peaked, symmetric preferences according to some func-
tion ui(pj) and their utility strictly decreases in the distance between a given policy
and their ideal point. For simplicity, utility is determined by their Euclidean dis-
tance1
ui(pj) =  kbi   pjk: (1.1)
Since voters are assumed to be utility maximizing, they will always cast their ballot
in favor of the candidate closest to their bliss point. In case two or more candidates
have chosen their platform at the exact same distance, he is indifferent and chooses
randomly between them.
Incomplete and Unreliable Information Candidates do not possess complete in-
formation about voter preferences. In particular, they do not know the distribution
of bliss points across policy space. In order to estimate the aggregate preference
structure, they depend on voters signalling their ideal points. Candidates remain,
however, incompletely informed for two reasons: First, candidates are not able to
take into account signals from the entire population of voters. Instead each can-
didate j is only able to consider cj voters in each election cycle. Heterogeneity of
candidates with respect to cj may be interpreted as differences in financial endow-
ments, infrastructure and political experience – generally, necessary prerequisites
to develop and implement balanced and inclusive policies based on voter prefer-
ences.
The second reason for the persistently incomplete knowledge lies in a behav-
ioral trait of voters: They are solely interested in policy outcomes, no matter which
candidate ends up implementing them. As voters try to maximize their personal
utility, they therefore always prefer a candidate to be closer to them than further
away. They are furthermore aware that candidates use their signals to assess voter
preferences when choosing a platform. Consequently, voters do not necessarily sig-
1A common alternative to this linear utility model is the quadratic utility uij =  kbi   pjk2.
Themain difference between both is the stronger relative penalty that the quadratic utility places on
distance. This paper follows Singh (2013), who argues that the linear formulation more accurately
reflects actual election outcomes.
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nal their true bliss points, but may instead distort their preferences strategically so
as to pull the respective candidate closer to them. In a similar fashion as Buechel,
Hellmann, and Klößner (2012)model themisrepresentation of individual opinions
by non-conformists in consensus-seeking discussions, voters tend to overstate their
preferences subject to the current platform the targeted candidate occupies. In par-
ticular, each voter has an innate propensity si by which they misrepresent their
signalled bliss point. So the opinion oij signalled by voter i to candidate j is given
by
oij = bi + si (bi   pj) : (1.2)
Candidates receive a random sample Sj of voter signals each period. The signal
sent by a specific voter always depends on the current platform taken up by the
candidate it is intended for and will not be the same for two candidates unless pj =
pk. Candidates therefore receive skewed information that depends on their current
platform, as well as the voters’ unobserved position and propensity to misrepresent
their preferences.
In each period, this randomly drawn sample of size cj provides a candidate with
a temporary set of opinions !j = foijgi2Sj , which serves as a basis for assessing the
preference structure of the voter population.
Candidate Behavior Candidates seek to be elected and therefore try to maximize
their expected vote share. But they cannot be sure about exact voter preferences
(especially since they estimate them using a sample of voters). This would, however,
be required tomodel candidates’ estimates of voting probabilities as a discontinuous
step function that only takes the values f0; 1g, depending on whether or not the
candidate is closest to a particular voter’s bliss point. Furthermore, votersmight not
necessarily be perfectly informed about candidate positions and thus perceive them
within a margin of error. Therefore even perfect knowledge of voter preferences
would not enable candidates to clearly demarcate regions of winning platforms.
In light of this, it is more realistic to base candidate decisions on a probabilistic
voting model, in which their likelihood of receiving a vote increases as their plat-
form approaches a voter’s ideal point. In order to preserve the generality of the
model, utility and not simply distance is considered in the likelihood function, be-
cause theremay be additional factors such as loyalty or ideology that influence voter
decisions. For simplicity, however, the utility function is reduced to distance in this
exposition. As explained above, candidates are imperfectly informed about voter
preferences and use oij as a proxy for bi, whichmay or may not coincide. The utility
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function of any voter i in a candidate’s maximization rationale is thus
vji (pk) = ui(pk j bi = oij) =  koij   pkk: (1.3)
This denotes candidate j’s estimate of voter i’s expected utility given candidate k’s
platform. The fact that voters may communicate different bliss points to different
candidates, i.e. pj 6= pk () oij 6= oik if si > 0, makes this superscript necessary
to indicate whose estimate is being considered.
In order to determine voting probabilities, a standard contest success function
is used and from the perspective of candidate j, the probability of receiving a vote
from voter i is
ij(p) =
ev
j
ijPm
k=1 e
vjik
with  > 0: (1.4)
Thisway ofmodelling the probabilistic voting scheme in conditional logit formgoes
back to a difference-based contest success function (Tullock, 1967, 1980; Hirshleifer,
1989; Coughlin, 1992) and has been applied in empirical studies on voting (e.g.
Adams & Merrill III, 2000; Merrill III & Adams, 2002).
Each candidate seeks tomaximize her expected vote share 1
n
Pn
i=1 ij . But since
probabilities can only be estimated for those voters included in the candidate’s own
sample Sj , the objective function is limited to
max
pj
j(pj j p j) = 1
cj
X
i2Sj
ev
j
ijPm
k=1 e
vjik
s.t. pj 6= pk for all k 2 P; (1.5)
conditional on all other candidate platforms p j = (p1;    ; pj 1; pj+1;    ; pM).
This implies that the candidate-specific set of voter opinions is treated by each can-
didate as if it were representative of the entire voter population.
1.3.2 Model Dynamics
From an individual voter’s perspective a biased disclosure of preferences attaches a
higher weight to his utility in the candidate’s decision-making process and therefore
also raises the expected utility from potential future policy. It is easy to show by
combining equations 1.2 and 1.3 that candidate j’s evaluation of voter i’s utility
becomes vji (pj) = (1+si)ui(pj). Thus strategic opinion distortion should increase
the weight attached to his true utility in candidate j’s estimate by (1 + si). But
1.4. SIMULATION 15
whether or not this actually increases the weight of his likelihood contribution in
the candidate’s maximization rationale depends on the spatial distribution of (i) the
other candidates and (ii) the other voters in the candidate’s polling sample.
Because a distorted communication of opinion si > 0 not only affects the re-
spective candidate’s estimate of voter utility given her own policy platform, so that
vji (pj) 6= ui(pj), it also changes the candidate’s estimate of the voter’s utility given
other candidates’ platforms: vji (pk) 6= ui(pk). This affects the relevant part of can-
didate’s objective function in the following way:
ij =
e (1+si)kbi pjkPm
k=1 e
 k(1+si)bi sipj pkk (1.6)
As voter i’s opinion is distorted to pull candidate j closer to bi, it also depends upon
the relative positions of other candidates k whether this actually increases ij com-
pared to a non-distorted signal. The relative positions of other parties, in turn, de-
pend on the overall distribution of voters.
Proposition 1 Whether or not a voter can benefit from distorted opinion signalling
depends upon her true bliss point in policy space. Only if it is located sufficiently far
from the center will the signalled opinion affect the candidate in the desired way and
increase the weight of the true opinion.
Due to the complexity created by the heterogeneity of actors in conjunctionwith
the multi-dimensional policy space, there is no closed-form analytical solution of
the model and we need to rely on numerical methods. The next section therefore
describes the approach taken to simulate the spatial voting model and presents the
results.
1.4 Simulation
In order to examine its dynamics and allow for emerging global behavior, the pro-
posed model was implemented as an agent-based model in NetLogo (Wilensky,
1999). For this simulation the number of policy dimensions is set to 2. Other rele-
vant parameters were varied between runs in order to be able to assess their effects
and see whether observed results are stable. Table 1.1 summarizes the ranges used
for each model parameter. Their permutations lead to 147 distinct parameter con-
stellations used in simulating the model. Each simulation run lasted 150 elections
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Table 1.1: Parameter ranges of simulation
Parameter Values
Candidates 2-8
Voters 203
Sample Size 5%, 20%, 100%
Distortion 0%, 20%, 80%
Distorting Voters 1, 20, 81
Voter Distribution N2(0; 25)
Policy Dimensions 2
Size of Policy Space 101 101
and each parameter set was replicated 30 times. During each run, data on voter and
candidate behavior as well as on election ourcomes were recorded for subsequent
analysis.2
Using the simulated data, a closer look at potential differences in the utility levels
of voters with and without distorted signals becomes possible. For this purpose,
a simple OLS-regression of after-election utility among voters who signalled their
opinions on their level of distortion can be estimated:
ui(pe) =  + si + ri + siri + "i; (1.7)
where pe identifies the policy platform elected by the majority of voters and ri de-
notes the distance of voter i’s bliss point from the center of policy space. Since
simulations were performed with normally distributed voters around the center,
controlling for the voter-specific distance is necessary. The interaction between
distortion and distance is of main interest here, since according to proposition 1,
only voters with extreme opinions, i.e. voters whose bliss point is located further
away from the center of policy space, should benefit from opinion distortion.
Estimation results of equation (1.7) are shown in table 1.2. As one would expect,
a higher distance of a voter’s bliss point from the center decreases utility on aver-
age. Distorting preference signals for candidates does not generally lead to higher
utility levels. However, the significant and positive interaction effect of distortion
2For a better understanding of the computational implementation details and in order to enable
the interested reader to replicate the results, an ODD description of the model is included in the
appendix (cf. Grimm et al., 2010).
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Table 1.2: OLS estimation of voter utility
Utility
High Distortion −0.383
(0.040)
Radius −0.866
(0.0003)
High Distortion Radius 0.009
(0.001)
Constant −6.763
(0.009)
N 7 447 400
Adjusted R2 0.542
p< .1; p< .05; p< .01
and distance clearly shows benefits of distorted signals for voters with extreme opin-
ions. On average, they seem to be able to influence candidates in a way that reduces
their distance compared to other voters within the same radius around the center
of policy space who do not distort their signals.
As the regression is run as a pooled model over different parameter constella-
tions, these represent average results. In order to further analyse the effects, fig-
ure 1.1 additionally depicts the benefits from opinion distortion conditional on the
number of candidates competing in elections as well as on the informational advan-
tage, i.e. the sample size, of one of the candidates. Since it is necessary to control for
the negative linear effect of distance on utility here as well, utility is depicted in rela-
tive terms compared to voters within the same radius corridor around the center of
policy space. Theupper row of figure 1.1 shows this relationship if all candidates use
little information and receive signals from 5% of the electorate. Only voters whose
true bliss point is located outside a radius around the center of more than 50% of
the maximum possible distance have an incentive to distort their signalled opinion.
With increasing electoral competition, these incentives are reduced and the radius
beyond which benefits from distortion can be observed increases. The middle and
lower rows of figure 1.1 furthermore highlight decreased incentives when the sam-
ple size of one of the candidates is larger and thus platforms are chosen based on
better information.
Lastly, the effects of better information on the behavior of candidates and elec-
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Figure 1.1: Benefits from opinion distortion by number of candidates and sample size
toral competition can be seen in figure 1.2. The number of election wins is sig-
nificantly higher if candidates can choose their platform based on a larger sample
size. This advantage holds up until 5 candidates compete in elections. Beyond this
threshold, choices of better informed candidates seem susceptible to randomness in
the model, i.e. their maximization of expected votes may at times be too exact and
thus minor deviations of anticipated behavior by voters or other candidates lead to
defeat.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper has developed a spatial voting model that incorporates incomplete and
unreliable information based on empirical research highlighting cognitive heuris-
tics and systematic misperceptions among politicians. Furthermore, an essential
property of themodel concerns the behavior of voters: In an age of constant, unlim-
ited communication and sufficient experience with the democratic process, voters
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Figure 1.2: Benefits from more voter information by number of candidates
can be expected to try to influence policy platforms to better suit their preferences.
Internalizing this interplay of voter preferences and electoral competition has lead
to the proposition, that only fringe voters with extreme opinions actually have an
incentive to signal their views in an attempt to influence policy platforms in elec-
tions. Agent-based simulations of the proposedmodel support this proposition and
show that these incentives for communicating extreme views are especially strong
under low electoral competition (i.e. with a small number of political candidates)
and when candidates base their decisions on little information.
These results may help explain the widespread shifts in public discourse we ob-
serve in recent years. If only supporters of extreme political views have an incentive
to proclaim their opinions because only they can reasonably expect to have the de-
sired impact on eventual policy, it is not surprising that the language and topics
of public discourse have gotten more extreme. With voters knowledgeable of the
mechanisms underlying the democratic process and candidates prone to consider-
ing only easily attainable information, moderate views do not benefit from efforts
to take over the discussion. Unfortunately, the logic of the proposed model also
implies that only after extreme views have succeeded to propagate extreme poli-
cies and not only preference signals but elected platforms have shifted to extremes
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would the moderate majority of voters have an incentive to dominate the political
discussion in an attempt to influence policy. The question is thus: How extreme a
shift is necessary to jolt the majority from its lethargy?
Even though the theoretical model presented in this paper takes up behavioral
properties from the empirical literature to inform its underlying assumptions, its
implications require empirical testing. For one, the moderating effect of the num-
ber of candidates produces a testable hypothesis: Can we observe much more ex-
treme opinions dominating the political discourse in two-party systems compared
to multi-party systems? Does this effect, for instance, also occur in the context
of simple yes or no referenda? Are presidential elections more susceptible to an ex-
treme discourse than parliamentary elections? Furthermore, since themodel shows
decreasing incentives with better informed candidates, newly established democra-
cies should exhibit a more polarized political discourse than consolidated democra-
cies. Finally, as the feedback loop of preference communication and platform evalu-
ation is at the center of the theorized mechanism, further research should also take
into account the political discourse in social media. The role of communication
bots and fake user profiles in shaping discussions or simulating support deserves
further analysis if we want to trace the mechanisms by which extreme views can
end up feeling familiar.
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Appendix
1.A Simulation Description – ODD-Protocol
1.A.1 Purpose
The simulation explores the effects of frictions in a spatial voting framework: in-
completely informed candidates encounter voters that may signal their opinions in
a strategically distorted way. Is it generally beneficial for voters to distort their sig-
nals strategically or only under certain circumstances? Do effects differ between
two-candidate and multi-candidate systems? Should candidates try to gain more
detailed knowledge about voter preferences or is there a threshold beyond which
more information is useless (or even harmful)?
1.A.2 Entities, State Variables, and Scales
There are two types of actors, voters and candidate, who both inhabit a location on
a grid of 101 101 cells. For voters, this location is fixed and represents their most
preferred policy (bliss point); candidates may change their location once per time
step, it represents their policy platform in an election. Furthermore, candidates are
heterogeneous in the number of voter signals they are able to consider per time
step. In each time step, they assess the preference structure of voters based on the
signals they receive. Voters, have a heterogeneous propensity to strategically distort
their true bliss point. In order to perform elections, voters each have one vote that
indicates one of the competing candidates. Each voter also determines after each
election his personal level of satisfaction given the election winner. One time step
represents one election cycle and simulations were run for 150 cycles.
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1.A.3 Process Overview and Scheduling
The following actions are executed once per time step:
• Candidates receive signals from a subset of voters, the size of which depends
on their respective ability to process signals. Candidates receive their signals
consecutively and in a random order (see submodel signalling).
• Voters signal their true or distorted bliss point (see submodel opinion).
• The set of signals to each candidate informs their current assessment of the
preference distribution in policy space.
• Candidates maximize their number of expected votes according to this esti-
mated preference structure by changing their location (see submodel choose
platform).
• An election takes place, in which all voters cast their vote for their preferred
candidate (i.e. the one being closest to them); the candidate with a simple
majority of votes wins (see submodel election).
• Voters determine their level of satisfaction given the elected candidates’s plat-
form.
1.A.4 Design Concepts
The following concepts and theories were taken into account for performing the
simulation:
• spatial voting in two dimensions
• bounded rationality
• strategic communication/preference distortion
• spatial tessellation
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1.A.5 Initialization
A specified number of voters (203 in the simulation runs) and candidates (simu-
lations were performed with 2 – 8) are initialized. Voters are scattered across the
10201 patches according to a bounded two-dimensional normal distribution with
zero mean and a standard deviation equal to 25% of the range in each dimension.
Candidates are placed randomly on an empty patch with uniform probability.
Each agent’s location at once defines their bliss point (voters) and current plat-
form (candidates). For all voters except of a subset the strategic propensity si is set
to zero. The size of the subset is user-specified and their strategic propensity is set to
a chosen value between zero and one (simulations were performed with 1, 20 and
80 agents receiving a strategic propensity of either 0.2 or 0.8). Voters are chosen
randomly to belong to the subset at the start of each simulation.
Candidates are assigned the number of voter signals they are able to consider per
time step: In one set of simulations, all candidates were only able to consider 5% of
the population in each period. Further sets of simulations were run, that had all but
one candidate still relying on 5% of opinions and one randomly selected candidate
having a competitive advantage. This advantage was being able to consider either
20% of opinions or even the entire voter population.
1.A.6 Input Data
No input from external models or data files is used.
1.A.7 Submodels
The following submodels are employed by agents at certain points in the simulation
process:
In order to create their list of bliss points for a subset of voters, candidates use
the submodel signalling in a random sequence. This lets them choose randomly a
certain number of voter signals from the entire population. Exactly how many sig-
nals a candidate receives is determined by the candidate-specific variable cj . Each
chosen voter is then asked for her bliss point, in reaction to which voters use the
submodel opinion. The signals are stored by the candidate as a list and used in the
submodel “choose platform” as an assessment of the spatial preference distribution.
The submodel opinion is employed by voters to signal their (possibly distorted)
bliss point. In case the voter is not currently at his preassigned bliss point, hemoves
28 CHAPTER 1. A RECIPE FOR EXTREME VIEWS
to its location. If he has no strategic propensity, he then simply signals his location
(x; y). If, however, his strategic propensity si is positive, the voter will face the
candidate targeted to receive the signal, move backwards by a fraction si of the
Euclidean distance to the candidate and report the resulting location. Since policy
space is bounded, a situationmay occur in which the voter cannot move as far away
from the candidate as his strategic propensity would make himwish to. In that case
the voter will distort her position as much as possible, i.e. move to and signal a
location on the boundary of policy space.
In the submodel choose platform, candidates calculate the expected share of
votes for each possible platform in policy space, then move to the location with
the highest share. They calculate the expected share for a single location by deter-
mining the sum of likelihoods of receiving a vote over all voters they have received
signals from. The likelihood is given by a logit function that uses Euclidean dis-
tance from the respective voter at the platform being considered. This submodel is
the numerical solution to the maximization problem stated in equation 1.5.
During the submodel election, the positions of all agents are fixed and voters
determine, which candidate is closest to their bliss point. This is achieved by divid-
ing up policy space into Voronoi polygons, using an algorithm byWilensky (2006).
Candidates act as generator points of the Voronoi polygon and their cells comprise
their respective constituency. Voters sense whose cell they lie in and set their vote
to reflect their preference for that candidate. Candidates then count the number of
their votes and the election winner is determined according to a simple majority
rule. A coin toss breaks potential ties.
Part II
Eruptions of Right-Wing Violence
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Chapter 2
Refugees Welcome? Introducing a
New Dataset on Anti-Refugee
Violence in Germany, 2014–2015
David Benček and Julia Strasheim
2.1 Introduction
In 2015, an ever rising number of refugees made their journey to the EuropeanUnion (EU) to seek asylum in one of the EU’s member states. According to theUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of early 2016,
most asylum applicants in Europe were Syrian citizens fleeing military advances by
both their government as well as the Islamic State (48 per cent of arrivals), closely
followed by refugees fromAfghanistan (21 per cent), where a withdrawal of foreign
troops has led to a resurgence of Taliban control (UNHCR, 2016). Most refugees
have sought asylum in Germany and Sweden, and particularly the German govern-
ment’s reaction towards incoming refugees has sparked international attention. By
the end of summer 2015, when other EUmember states began closing their borders,
Chancellor Angela Merkel publicly pledged that Germany would offer temporary
residence to all incoming refugees. Her government also suspended applying the
EU’s Dublin III Regulation that determines the member state responsible to exam-
ine asylumapplications. In addition to this “open-arms policy” (Hockenos, 2015) of
the German Chancellor, television footage of cheering citizens welcoming refugees
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at the Munich train station stood out in comparison to increasingly restrictive poli-
cies towards refugees across the EU.
Not everyone welcomed refugees to Germany. The Christlich-Soziale Union
(Christian Social Union, CSU) – the Bavaria-based sister party to Merkel’s Christ-
lich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union, CDU) and a partner in
the national coalition government – soon openly challenged Merkel’s descisions,
an act previously unthinkable in German consensus politics. Simultaneously, the
new right-wing party Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany, AfD)
started to attract an increasing number of voters in polls.1 In addition to these polit-
ical reactions, xenophobic violence directed against refugees and their supporters
was on the rise throughout 2015 (Deutsche Welle, 2015). This violence reached
a tragic climax in October 2015, when Cologne city official Henriette Reker was
stabbed in the neck over her position towards refugees during an electoral cam-
paign event.
Anti-refugee violence and social unrest is not new to post-Cold War Germany,
and a number of scholarly analyses have shed light on this phenomenon in the past.
To name a few prominent examples, Koopmans and Olzak (2004) study the causal
links between public discourse and xenophobic violence in Germany, analyzing
over 11 000 public statements in the period from 1990 to 1999 (cf. also Koopmans,
1996). Their findings suggest that media attention to right-wing violence affects
both the precise targets of such attacks as well as these attacks’ temporal and spa-
tial distribution (cf. a similar analysis on xenophobic violence in the Netherlands
by Braun, 2011). Krell, Nicklas, and Ostermann (1996) also investigate the links be-
tween rising numbers of asylum seekers inGermanyduring the early 1990s and anti-
refugee violence, presenting both a typology of the perpetrators as well as studying
the explanatory power of various theories in order to account for the rising number
of attacks. AndWillems similarly focuses on the perpetrators of right-wing violence
in Germany by analyzing police data on their biographical and socio-demographic
characteristics (Willems, 1995a) as well as public opinion polls, arguing inter alia
that anti-refugee activist groups are far too heterogeneous “to be sweepingly labeled
as racists” (Willems, 1995b). These studies tie into a broader literature on how im-
migration links to the rise of right-wing extremism and xenophobia in theWestern
world, that has in the past particularly been driven by studies modeling the emer-
gence of extreme right-wing populist parties and voting behavior (e.g. Betz, 1993;
1In March 2016, the AfD gained a significant share of votes in regional elections and entered
three state parliaments.
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Rydgren, 2005; Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002;
Green-Pedersen & Odmalm, 2008) as well as of anti-immigration movements (e.g.
Fetzer, 2000; Brown, 2013).
The recent spread of anti-refugee sentiments in German politics and society has
already sparked academic interest, but investigations have thus far overwhelmingly
concentrated on explaining the rise of the right-wing anti-immigration movement
Pegida (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes, or Patriotic
Europeans against the Islamization of theOccicent) that flourished in late 2014 (e.g.
Dostal, 2015; Vorländer, Herold, & Schäller, 2016). A lack of systematic data collec-
tion and data processing of the recent anti-refugee events in Germany has thus far
inhibited a thorough quantitative investigation of this phenomenon, its patterns,
dynamics, drivers, and consequences. This paper therefore introduces a new geo-
referenced event dataset on Anti-Refugee Violence and Social Unrest in Germany
(hereafter ARVIG) during 2014 and 2015.2 Our dataset is based on information
collected by two civil society organizations that we process to make it usable for sta-
tistical research. The dataset identifies in total 1 645 events of four different types of
right-wing violence and social unrest: demonstrations, assault, arson attacks, and
miscellaneous attacks against refugee housing. In the following sections we first
present data sources, discuss the categorization of different types of right-wing vi-
olence, and describe the process of constructing the dataset, before we outline the
variables included in the dataset. Afterwards we discuss initial descriptive statistics
of patterns of anti-refugee violence and social unrest in Germany. We conclude the
paper by outlining several potential uses of the dataset in future research.
2.2 Creating the Dataset
In order to create the ARVIG dataset, we rely on information released on the web-
site Mut Gegen Rechte Gewalt or Courage against Right-Wing Violence (MGRG),
a project that was started in August 2000 by the Amadeu Antonio Foundation
and the weekly magazine Stern. This website provides a public chronicle of anti-
refugee violence and social unrest since 2014 and we include all available entries
between 01.01.2014 and 31.12.2015 in the dataset.3 The chronicle provided by the
2The ARVIG dataset is made available as an R data package and can be found along with instal-
lation instructions at https://github.com/davben/arvig.
3Quarterly updates of the dataset are planned, provided that MGRG keeps publishing the infor-
mation.
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MGRG project is itself based on information collected by two civil society orga-
nizations. The first is the Amadeu Antonio Foundation itself that was named af-
ter Angolan citizen Amadeu Antonio Kiowa, who was one of the first victims of
right-wing violence in reunified Germany when he was beaten to death by extrem-
ist youths in 1990. The foundation was started in 1998 with the explicit goal to
strengthen German civil society activism against right-wing extremism, racism,
and anti-Semitism (Amadeu Antonio Stiftung, 2016a). The second organization is
PRO ASYL, founded in 1986, shortly after significant restrictions were introduced
to the German asylum law that resulted in greater difficulties for people persecuted
in their home countries to secure lasting protection inGermany (Förderverein PRO
ASYL e.v., 2016). Both the Amadeu Antonio Foundation and PRO ASYL belong to
the largest andmost respected pro immigration advocacy organizations and closely
work together with international human rights organizations, which increases our
confidence in the quality and transparency of their data collection.
2.2.1 Categories of Right-Wing Violence
The chronicle provided by the MGRG project documents four different types of
attacks and unrest against refugees and refugee housing in Germany: demonstra-
tions, assault, arson attacks, andmiscellaneous attacks against refugee housing. The
collection is based on a variety of sources, including public reporting in newspaper
articles, press releases by the German police, parliamentary interpellations as well
as publicly accessible reports by local and regional organizations offering advice and
consultation for victims of right-wing violence (Amadeu Antonio Stiftung, 2016b).
The first type of violence and social unrest reported byMGRG are events of anti-
refugee demonstrations, such as the rallies staged by Pegida since December 2014.
The causes and dynamics of xenophobic protests have in the past been thoroughly
studied by researchers interested in social movement theory (see e.g. Della Porta,
2000; Holdt & Alexander, 2012), and our data thus provides the opportunity to test
existing theories on a new case. To give one example of the demonstrations the
MGRG project reports, on 14 March 2015, 180 people protested against the con-
struction of a new refugee shelter in the city of Flöha in Saxony. The demonstra-
tion was registered by Pegida-spokesperson Steffen Musolt and at least one man
was reported shouting “Sieg Heil!” (Freie Presse, 2015). Notably, MGRG points
out that because anti-refugee demonstrations and rallies have been on the rise in
recent years, it is impossible to collect information on every single one of them.
Thus, demonstrations can be expected to be under-reported in the chronicle – and
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thus also in the dataset presented here.⁴
The second type of violence reported by the MGRG project concerns physical
assaults and bodily injuries. For instance, on 12 January 2015, a Libyan asylum
seeker was heavily injured in Dresden. He had been asked for cigarettes by “men
wearing bomber jackets,” and after he did not understand the question, one of the
men reportedly poured hot liquid over his face, shoulders, and arms, making it nec-
essary for him to seek medical treatment (Morgenpost, 2015). There exist some
limitations to the reporting of this type of violence as well: MGRG notes that infor-
mation on assault is only recorded in the chronicle if an individual with refugee
status is targeted. Assault of, for instance, left-wing and pro-refugee protesters,
volunteers helping incoming refugees, or journalists covering xenophobic rallies,
are not recorded. Furthermore, and resembling a problem faced by many criminal
statistics, MGRG points out that the actual number of assaults – irrespective of the
victim’s status – is likely to be much higher than what is reported in the chronicle
(Amadeu Antonio Stiftung, 2016b).
The third and fourth type of anti-refugee violence reported by MGRG provide
information on arson attacks against refugee housing, as well as on miscellaneous
attacks against such shelters. For instance, on 23 March 2015, a group of unknown
attackers was reported trying to set fire to a school in Berlin-Kreuzberg that houses
refugees (Berlin Online, 2015). Miscellaneous attacks against refugee housing com-
prise instances of rocks thrown at shelters or xenophobic graffiti. For example, on 8
January 2015, unknown attackers painted swastikas on the walls of a house in Haus-
berge/Porta Westfalica (North Rhine-Westphalia) that was supposed to be turned
into a refugee shelter (Mindener Tageblatt, 2015).
In addition to these four distinct categories, some of the reported events include
mixed forms of anti-refugee attacks, such as demonstrations in the course of which
refugee shelters were attacked: On 6March 2015, an anti-asylum demonstration of
1500 people in Freital (Saxony) not only attacked police officers and journalists with
pyrotechnics, but some demonstrators also forced their way to a refugee shelter and
reportedly vandalized the building (Tagesspiegel, 2015). A small number of events
in the dataset is not categorized as they do not belong to any of the four basic event
⁴MGRG also notes that under-reporting has become a problem mostly since January 2016, at
which point the Amadeu Antonio Foundation and PRO ASYL have limited themselves to reporting
demonstrations that specifically disregarded German law, meaning that the demonstration was ille-
gal and not registered with the authorities beforehand, the demonstration included assaults against
journalists or police, or demonstrators were reported using hate speech (Volksverhetzung) (Amadeu
Antonio Stiftung, 2016b).
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Table 2.1: Frequencies of event categories
Category N
Demonstrations 443
Assault 195
Arson attacks 157
Miscellaneous attacks 763
Arson & miscellaneous attacks 8
Demonstrations & assault 8
Demonstration & miscellaneous attacks 16
Demonstration & miscellaneous attacks & assault 1
Miscellaneous attacks & assault 29
Other 25
types. Examples include the distribution of xenophobic leaflets or public banners
with right-wing extremist slogans. Table 2.1 summarizes the frequencies of all ob-
served event types as reported by theMGRG project. Figure 2.1 offers a geographic
overview of all recorded events. For a more concise presentation, multi-category
events have been split and counted once in each of their respective categories.
By including events from this broad set of categories, our dataset covers a wider
range of anti-refugee violence than some previous studies on the topic. For in-
stance, studying right-wing violence against asylum seekers in the Netherlands,
Braun (2011) relies on data on the timing and location of events provided by the
Anne Frank Stichting, which defines right-wing violence as “[purposive] infliction
of material or physical damage to targets, chosen because of their different cultural,
national, ethnic, racial or religious background” (cited in Braun, 2011). In our
categorization, Braun’s conceptualization of anti-refugee violence would thus only
cover the “assault” category. We however prefer our broad conceptualization of
anti-refugee violence and social unrest for two reasons: First, a broad concept that
also includes demonstrations and attacks against property allows researchers not
only to distinguish between different types of xenophobic attacks, but also to study
degrees of severity. In that regard, our dataset can be used to help answer research
questions that deal with the escalation of xenophobic extremism over time. Second,
our broad conceptualization also relates more closely to other recent event data col-
lections on global instances of violence and social unrest, such as the Social Con-
flict Analysis Database (SCAD) that covers protests, riots, strikes, inter-communal
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Figure 2.1: Geographic overview of events by category
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conflict, and government violence against civilians in Africa and Central America
(Salehyan et al., 2012).
2.2.2 Webscraping and Geocoding
To construct the ARVIG dataset, we primarily relied on webscraping the informa-
tion available in the MGRG chronicle. This is possible for all events from 1 January
2015 onwards as they are neatly separated in the HTML code of theMGRGwebsite,
and we used the rvest package in the software environment R that was designed to
harvest data from HTML web pages (Wickham, 2015). For the 2014 events, web-
scraping proved insufficient, because the entries on the MGRG website are not as
neatly structured in the HTML code. Hence, we manually copied the 2014 events,
cleaned the data and merged it with the 2015 events.
Next, we extracted the information on the location and the respective federal
state from the dataset and used the Google Maps API to geocode the location. It
proved necessary to take both location and federal state, in order to avoid confu-
sion between two locations with the same name, such as Friedberg (Hessen) and
Friedberg (Bayern). Each event is thereby mapped to a longitude and latitude with
municipality-level precision. This enables us to place each event on a high res-
olution map of Germany that includes geospatial information on all 11 306 Ger-
manmunicipalities (Gemeinden) and determine the corresponding official 12-digit
Community Identitification Number (Regionalschlüssel).⁵
2.2.3 Variables and Patterns
The ARVIG dataset contains 10 variables that characterize each recorded event.
First, we provide the exact date at which an event of interest occurred. Currently, all
dates lie between 1 January 2014 and 31 December 2015. Events were recorded on
563 of the 730 days covered by the dataset (cf. the frequency distribution in figure
2.2). The date for which the highest number of events was recorded is 29 August
2015, with a staggering count of 17 anti-refugee events, including six demonstra-
tions, ten miscellaneous attacks against refugee shelters, as well as one instance of
assault occurring inHalle (Saale), where a refugee fromGuinea-Bissauwas insulted,
beaten and kicked by six to eight individuals.
⁵The partition of municipalities in Germany is constantly changing – our dataset classifies the
events based on the status of 1 January 2015.
2.2. CREATING THE DATASET 39
0
50
100
150
0 5 10 15
Events per day
Co
un
t
Figure 2.2: Histogram of events per day
Next our dataset specifies the location and federal state of events as reported by
MGRG (in German writing, thus including umlauts). All federal states of Germany
have seen right-wing violence and social unrest in 2014 and 2015, but with strong
variation in the number of events. By far the highest number of anti-refugee vio-
lence and unrest was recorded in Saxony, with 394 events in the 24 months under
analysis, followed by North Rhine-Westphalia (231 events) and Berlin (210 events).
The traditionally left-wing governed Bremen (where all State Premiers since 1945
have belonged to the Social Democratic Party), on the other hand, saw only 2 events
in the past two years: two arson attacks on 26October 2015 and 26 September 2015.
If we control for state inhabitants, the densely populated North Rhine-Westphalia
drops out of the top three and is replaced byMecklenburg-Vorpommern – a federal
state that has a history of xenophobic violence against asylum seekers, for instance
when between 22 and 24 August 1992, several hundred violent protesters in the
Lichtenhagen district of Rostock threw stones and petrol bombs at a refugee shel-
ter and were applauded by an even larger crowd of bystanders. Figure 2.3 depicts
the number of events per 100 000 inhabitants for all federal states and shows a clear
divide between West and East Germany in their treatment of refugees.
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Figure 2.3: Events per 100 000 inhabitants by state and category
Figure 2.4 additionally depicts this relationship at the district level. This map
again highlights the high number of anti-refugee events taking place in East Ger-
many, with a particularly high count in the district of Saxon Switzerland-East Ore
Mountains (Sächsische Schweiz-Osterzgebirge). This district had in total 67 events of
anti-refugee violence, including 10 instances of assault, 5 instances of arson, and 21
miscellaneous attacks in 2014 and 2015, while being sparsely populated with only
245 954 inhabitants – fewer than cities such as Mannheim, Karlsruhe, or Bonn.
In order to facilitate disaggregated analyses of the data, the ARVIG dataset also
contains the 12-digit Community Identification Number of the respective munici-
pality each event has occured in. This standardized identifier is taken from offi-
cial statistics and thus makes it easy to merge highly disaggregated data from other
sources with the ARVIG dataset. The data show that 640 individual municipali-
ties within Germany experienced right-wing extremist violence and social unrest
against refugees in 2014 and 2015. With a total of 215, Berlin has seen the largest
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Figure 2.4: Events per 100 000 inhabitants by district (districts with zero events are grey)
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Figure 2.5: Events by weekdays and category
number of events, 40% of which were demonstrations and 44% were miscellaneous
attacks. For more detailed spatial analyses we also provide longitude and latitude of
the respective event location.
The dataset furthermore contains the event category provided by MGRG both
in German and in English. This enables us to observe an interesting variation as
to when events occurred when we analyse each type of event separately: For Fig-
ure 2.5 we again split up multi-category events and added them once to each of
their respective categories. We can observe that in terms of their distribution over
weekdays, assault, arson andmiscellaneous attacks behave quite similarly: They are
relatively evenly distributed over all seven days of the week, with minor spikes on
the weekends (more prominent for assault andmiscellaneous attacks on Saturdays).
Demonstrations, on the other hand, show a very strong spike on Saturdays. This
could indicate that while demonstrations are planned and organized – theymust be
registeredwith the police beforehand, after all – the other three types of anti-refugee
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violence and unrest occur more spontaneously. This distribution is at least to some
extent suprising because past research has found that acts of right-wing violence in
Germany occur disproportionately often on weekend nights (Braun & Koopmans,
2010), a finding that is usually linked to alcohol consumption of young men. Also
Braun (2011) has found that weekend nights – and summer periods – are strong
predictors for an increased hazard of xenophobic violence in the Netherlands, and
(as we have mentioned above) Braun does not even include demonstrations in his
categorization of anti-refugee violence, which seems to be the main driver of week-
end occurrences in our dataset.
Table 2.2: Sample event from the ARVIG dataset
Variable Sample
date 2015-03-06
location Freital
state Sachsen
community_id 146280110110
longitude 13.6512413
latitude 51.0008667
category_de Kundgebung/Demo & Sonstige Angriffe auf Unterkünfte
category_en demonstration & miscellaneous attack
description AmFreitag gab es in Freital die ersteAnti-Asyl-Demonstration unter
dem Motto “Freital wehrt sich. Nein zum Hotelheim”. Daran
beteiligten sich etwa 1500 Personen. Einige Teilnehmende ver-
suchten die geplante Route zu verlassen. Sie attackierten die Polizei
mit Pyrotechnik, um zum Leonardo-Hotel zu gelangen, wo seit
Mittwoch die ersten von bis zu 200 Flüchtlingen untergebracht sind.
Nur mit Mühe konnte die Polizei die gewaltbereiten Asylgegner
aufhalten. Laut Twitter hat einer von ihnen einen Brandanschlag
gegen die Unterkunft angedroht. Außerdem wurde von einem
übergriff auf einen Fotojournalisten berichtet. Dieser sei bepöbelt,
bedrängt und geschubst worden. Zuvor soll eine Person auf Face-
book folgende Botschaft gepostet haben: “Dann komme ich heute
Nacht wieder und zünde das Ding an”.
source http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/attacken-und-proteste-in-
gera-freital-hoyerswerda-neonazis-und-besorgte-buerger-gegen-
fluechtlingsheime/11472054.html
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Finally, a description of the event (in German language) as as well as a source of
this description, such as a link to a news website is provided. To illustrate this set
of variables, Table 2.2 provides a sample record from the dataset.
2.3 Conclusion: Using the Dataset
This paper introduced new georeferenced event data on anti-refugee violence and
social unrest in Germany in 2014 and 2015. Based on a public chronicle provided
by theMutGegen Rechte Gewalt project, wewebscraped and processed the available
information so as to make them accessible for statistical research on anti-refugee
violence. The dataset complements existing research on the determinants and ef-
fects of anti-refugee attacks in Germany andWestern Europe with new and system-
atic data. The event-based coding as well as the adherent information on event-
locations make the data useful for a variety of analyses, both event-based or ag-
gregated to German administrative units such as the municipalities (Gemeinden)
or districts (Kreise). In that regard, the data presented here offer a starting point
to analyze the recent rise in anti-refugee violence from different disciplinary back-
grounds, including, but not limited to, criminology, sociology, political science, or
economics.
For instance, and as we have outlined in the introduction to this article, a num-
ber of studies have reflected upon the determinants of anti-refugee violence in the
1990s: (youth) unemployment, the success of right-wing political parties, and me-
dia discourses have been identified as strong predictors of violent outbursts. It
would be interesting to examine if the recent rise of anti-refugee attacks adheres
to the same old pattern, or whether different predictors have stronger explanatory
power.
Kuechler (1994) has for instance argued that in the early 1990s an analysis of
survey data indicated “strikingly similar patterns of hostility towards foreigners”
between citizens in East and West Germany. Yet our data show a clear divide of
anti-refugee violence and unrest between East and West Germany. What factors
explain this variation? And what effects does this variation in anti-refugee violence
have on other variables, such as patterns of social cohesion within German munic-
ipalities, or patterns of integration of asylum seekers? Since we include the Com-
munity ID (Regionalschlüssel) in our dataset, researchers have the opportunity to
merge ARVIG easily with all official German statistical data in order to explore any
underlying relationships.
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Similarly, our descriptive and preliminary analysis of patterns in anti-refugee vi-
olence inGermany in 2014 and 2015 already pointed to a surprising finding, namely
that besides the occurrence of demonstrations, other types of anti-refugee violence
are spread evenly across weekdays. As this goes directly against previous findings
on the issue, more research on why this is the case would be advantageous. Can we
detect, for instance, similar developments for other types of crime?
Further, events that have gained a lot of media attention have shaped public
and political discourse. As the impact of public discourse on the outbreak of vi-
olence has been established by previous research (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004), our
event-based data enable researchers to identify key events that may have increased
or decreased the ensuing level of violence. Is anti-refugee violence, for instance, a
direct reaction to fears of terrorist violence in Europe? Does it increase after terror-
ist attacks (and the subsequent media reports), or are these events unrelated?
Finally, our dataset is also valuable to scholars conducting qualitative or mixed-
methods research on the causes and consequences of anti-refugee violence. ARVIG
enables scholars to carry out systematic case selection, for instance if they aim to
compare municipalities with high levels of anti-refugee violence and unrest with
municipalities with low levels of such violence.
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Chapter 3
Explaining Hate Crimes Against
Refugees in Germany: Contagion or
Local Determinants?
David Benček and ChristianMartin
3.1 Introduction
Western Europe has recently witnessed a massive inflow of asylum seek-ers, refugees, and migrants. In Germany alone, an estimated 1.1 Miorefugees arrived during the year of 2015 (Bundesministerium des Innern
[BMI], 2016a). Parts of the German populace reacted with shows of civic engage-
ment and support. However, as data published recently by the German Federal
Office for the Protection of the Constitution (“Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz”)
show, attacks on refugee shelters increased fivefold between 2014 and 2015 (BMI,
2016b, pp. 26-28). These attacks were by no means the only shows of xenophobic
sentiment. Rallies organized by groups like “Pegida” (“Patriotische Europäer gegen
die Islamisierung des Abendlandes” – “Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization
of the Occicent”) drew ever larger numbers of supporters with some participants
advocating lynching members of a federal government they viewed as incapable
of handling a perceived refugee crisis or whom they outright accused of a plan
to “replace” the German population (Vorländer, Herold, & Schäller, 2016). The
AfD (“Alternative für Deutschland” – “Alternative for Germany”), a party that af-
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ter some splits and leadership quarrels now clearly presents itself as a right-wing
populist party, attracted large numbers of voters with a platform of anti-Islam and
anti-immigration sentiments.
This is the context against which this paper investigates the determinants of
three types of right-wing violence in the years 2014 and 2015, namely assault on
refugees, attacks on refugee shelters, and a specific type of attack, arson. We are
interested primarily in whether these events can be explained by local conditions
(for example levels of unemployment) or if they are driven by spill-overs from prior
events. The underlying question is, then, one about the dynamics that drive right-
wing extremist violence: Does it spread or is it locally determined and, thus, locally
contained? The answer to this question is both theoretically interesting and politi-
cally relevant. We argue that, unlike other crimes, hate crimes against refugees carry
a political message. While a perpetrator might act out of motives that are in part
locally determined, the act of right-wing violence itself goes beyond the immediate
target of the attack. For example, a perpetrator might act because he is unemployed
and uneducated (Krell, Nicklas, & Ostermann, 1996) and fears competition from
refugees at the lower end of the labor market (McLaren, 1999), and has had limited
exposure to foreigners (Steinmayr, 2016). The crime itself however, to the extent
that it is observed by others, could increase the probability that a potential perpetra-
tor somewhere else will act, too. The reason for this is the informational externality
that emanates from the crime. Others will learn from it or will emulate the action
because an act of right-wing violence has been committed somewhere else.
More generally, in a setup like this, actors are not independent fromone another
but their utility functions are connected. We draw on a simple theoretical model
that allows for interdependence between actors in the style of Granovetter (1978)
or Kuran (1997). In these and other models like them, actors base their cost-benefit
calculation of a specific action (e.g. participating in an anti-immigrant demonstra-
tion; firebombing a refugee shelter) in part on the decisions of others to do the same
thing. Every individual has a threshold that is a function of the proportion of actors
in a population who have to do the same thing in order for the individual to act ac-
cordingly. This basic model setup can give rise to spill-overs in the absence of any
exogenous change in preferences (which makes these models attractive to attempts
at parsimoniously and non-trivially explaining switching behavior in populations).
We argue that not all kinds of anti-immigrant actions can be expected to exert
the same spill-over dynamics. Rather, the influence on other actors hinges upon
the generalizability of the action perpetrated. Against this backdrop we show that
assault exerts the strongest spill-over dynamics in the sense that it is themost gener-
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alizable form of hate crime, positively and significantly influencing the occurrence
of other forms of physical attacks like arson and miscellaneous attacks on property.
Distinguishing between local and regional determinants on the one hand and
spill-over dynamics on the other hand, we will first test hypotheses about local and
regional conditions that have been argued in the literature (see below) to be poten-
tial drivers of anti-immigrant hate crimes. These local and regional hypotheses are,
first, concernedwith a possible backlash against globalization andmodernization in
the form of a new cleavage that has emerged over the last three decades, second, the
deprivation hypothesis and competition hypothesis, i.e., respectively, labor market
and overall economic conditions (deprivation), as well as their relation to the over-
all immigrant population (competition), and, lastly, the contact hypothesis, i.e. the
idea that more exposure to immigrants may lead to a reduction in anti-immigrant
sentiment and, consequently, hate crimes.
We will first test these hypotheses by using standard non-spatial and spatio-
temporal econometric models. In an additional step, we import a methodologi-
cal innovation from epidemiology into political science, namely the point process
model proposed by Meyer, Elias, and Höhle (2012). To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first time that this continuous space-timemodel has been used in political
science.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 describes our theo-
retical framework for explaining hate crimes against refugees based on the relevant
literature and distinguishes between local determinants and the mechanism of vi-
olence diffusion. We present the dataset for our empirical analysis in section 3.3
along with a detailed description of specific variable operationalizations. Section
3.4 contains the empirical models and discusses their results while section 3.5 con-
cludes with a summary and perspectives for future research.
3.2 Theoretical Perspectives
This section distinguishes between two different drivers of hate crimes. Wewill first
look at local determinants before turning to spill-over and diffusion effects.
3.2.1 Local Determinants
There is a vast literature on delinquency and, more generally, deviant behavior
from sociology and criminology. Roughly speaking, these can be grouped into ap-
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proaches that focus on structural conditions to explain crime, and others that focus
on the individual level. In the latter group, psychological approaches can be found
that treat delinquency, and hate crimes more specifically, as possibly pathological
phenomena pertaining to disturbed individuals (e.g. Craig, 2002; Perry, 2001). We
will not cover those here and rather focus on rational actor assumptions underlying
the explanation of hate crimes.
In a sense, hate crimes are unlike other crimes since they are hard to graspwithin
a non-trivial and non-redundant rational actor framework. Whereas a burglar’s
actions can be readily explained by asessing his net expected pay-off, this logic of
explanation seems less adequate in the case of hate crimes.
Against this backdrop, explanations center on the relative deprivation of indi-
viduals and their feeling of frustration that are brought about by factors like un-
employment and dissatisfaction with the political system (Runciman, 1966). Con-
structing a connection between structural change and individual preferences are
theories that point to the emergence of “post-materialist” values as a by-product of
modernization processes (Inglehart, 1977). Post-materialist individuals seek self-
actualization in the form of self-determination. They eschew authoritarian values
and are therefore less prone to the allure of right-wing political parties. Drawing
on the initial work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), numerous scholars have pointed
out that the rise of green parties can be explained by this new societal cleavage (e.g.
Alber, 1989; Dolezal, 2010).
Using the same logic, a new cleavage has been argued to have emerged over the
last two decades as a consequence of economic and political integration, namely a
cleavage line that – broadly speaking – separates winners and losers of globalization
and technological change (e.g. Bornschier, 2010). Along this new cleavage, right-
wing authoritarian and populist parties have garnered support and made their way
into most of Western Europe’s party systems. More generally, according to this
view, right-wing extremism can be attributed to losers of modernization processes
in advanced societies (Heitmeyer, 1993).
These factors can be hypothesized to influence the probability of an anti-refugee
or ant-immigrant hate crime occurring. With higher unemployment andmore sup-
port of right-wing parties as signs of deprivation and the relevance of a pro- and
anti-globalization cleavage, this probability can be excepted to rise. On the other
hand, strong support for green parties as a sign of cultural change towards more
openness should reduce anti-immigrant sentiment and – possibly – hate crimes.
While there is no straightforward connection between anti-immigrant senti-
ment and hate crimes against refugees, the probability of a hate crime occurring can
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be plausibly expected to rise if anti-immigration sentiment is higher. Reasons for
this might be that low-skilled workers fear labor market competition from refugees
with the same skill set (e.g.McLaren, 1999). Such competitionmodels have recently
been tested more rigorously. For example, Helbling and Kriesi (2014) have tested
attitudes towards high- and low skilled immigrants in Switzerland using an online
survey. They reject the labormarket competitionmodel and find an anti-immigrant
effect that is conditional upon an individual’s economic situation and tax burden.
Their findings are compatible with results from a study on right-wing politi-
cal party support in Austria (Steinmayr, 2016). Using a natural experiment where
the treatment is settlement of refugees in Austrianmunicipalities, Steinmayr (2016)
shows that contact with refugees decreases support for the right-wing populist FPÖ
party. This is in line with a long standing argument from social psychology, namely
the contact hypothesis which states that contact between different groups leads to
a decrease in conflict between these groups (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998).
Steinmayr’s (2016) results are, however, in contrast to findings in the litera-
ture on crimes committed against immigrants. Connecting demographic change
with hate crimes against immigrants, Green, Strolovitch, andWong (1998) find that
hate crimes against ethnic minorities in New York were most pronounced in those
mostly white neighborhoods that had recently witnessed immigration of minori-
ties. This result is mirrored by Grattet (2009) who finds similar effects for predom-
inantly white neighborhoods, but not for neighborhoods that are predominantly
non-white.
Overall, the results on local determinants of anti-immigrant and anti-refugee
sentiment as well as anti-immigrant crimes are mixed. A possible explanation for
the inconclusiveness of the evidence is that only local determinants are considered.
If there are spill-over effects that are present but not considered, this may result in
omitted variable bias that could cloud the results. Therefore, in the next section,
we turn to a theoretical consideration of external effects, diffusion and spill-over
dynamics.
3.2.2 Spill-over Effects and Diffusion
The vastly diverse literature on interdependence and diffusion (of policies, cultural
practices, innovations, and otherwise) is predicated upon a common tenet, namely
that events “here” can be partially explained by the same or similar events occur-
ring “there”. “Here” and “there” are mostly defined in geographical terms; in po-
litical science, this is frequently cast as jurisdictions influencing one another. The
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four basic mechanisms of diffusion discussed in the literature are coercion, compe-
tition, learning, and emulation. With respect to hate crimes, the latter two of these
four – learning and emulation – seem to be most relevant. Actors in a territorially
defined unit i observe actions that occur in units j. This induces them (causally)
to act as well. Note that this is best understood in a probabilistic framework where
something happening in j influences the probability of something happening in i.
Applying a threshold model in the vein of Granovetter (1978), an individual in
unit i will take action if “enough” individuals in unit j will take the same action
or similar actions. More generally, actions are not independent from one another.
Thus, they are not only determined by local conditions towhich an individual is sub-
jected, but are rather co-determined by the choices other people make. Therefore,
dynamics may ensue that cannot be explained by local determinants alone. This
is the basic insight of models of collective dynamics. Just what it is that diffuses is
hard to pin down exactly. While it is fairly easy to show empirically that events or
policies are spatially interdependent, identifying causal mechanisms that link i to j
is a matter of theory. For the context of this paper, we surmise that different types
of hate crimes have different informational content that trigger different types of
reactions across actors. More specifically, an actor contemplating whether to par-
ticipate in an anti-refugee protest will take his or her clues from other people doing
the same thing elsewhere. An anti-refugee protest in j can give an informational
clue to an individual in i that changes an individual’s expected utility from partici-
pating in a protest in i. This may pertain to the perception of social acceptability of
anti-refugee protests as well as more rational calculations about the marginal effect
of one’s showing at a protest.
Unlike protests, acts of violence are individual rather than collective. There is no
utility from a mob setting fire to a refugee shelter. Rather, an individual deciding
on whether or not to commit an act of arson will consider his or her chances of
getting away with this action. Therefore, violent actions in other units can serve as
an informational clue in i that there are more of these actions and the individual
probability of being caught is smaller, assuming constant efforts by law enforcement
agencies.
Both types of actions are independent and follow a threshold logic with non-
linear dynamics and switching points. But the empirical implications are different:
Whereas the occurrence of anti-immigrant demonstrations is likely increased by
anti-immigrant demonstrations in other units alone, acts of violence can be seen as
substitutes with respect to their informational content. Therefore, we expect them
to exert a stronger diffusion influence since their informational content is more
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generalizable to other acts of violence than the informational content of demon-
strations which pertain to demonstrations alone.
This also implies that estimating different types of events and the interdepen-
dence of one type of event across units separately in an empirical model will not
tell the whole story. Rather, depending on the type of event, interdependence may
occur between different types of events. If different events are interdependent but
their interdependence is not taken into account, local determinants as well as the in-
terdependence between the same type of event may be upwardly biased (Genovese,
Kern, & Martin, 2016).
While the literature on policy diffusion generally distinguishes between four
different mechanisms of diffusion (coercion, competition, emulation, and learning
(Dobbin, Simmons, & Garrett, 2007)), for this paper, we consider only the latter
two, emulation and learning. While learning fits rather easily into a rational actor
framework with incomplete information, the case is different with emulation. An
actor emulating an action that has been taken elsewhere does not to do so because
of an incentive emanating from that action. Rather, he copies the action because of
the action itself. That is, there are no (positive or negative) externalities stemming
from the event elsewhere. The motivation to copy the action must be found in the
actor himself, his psychological or pathological makeup that is somehow triggered
into taking action because somewhere else someone else has taken the same action.
Events can then become “contagious” as they spread across different spatially de-
fined units, for example municipalities or counties. Of course, not the event itself
spreads but the actions taken by individuals or groups.
Empirically, this does not make a difference since the exact mechanism of dif-
fusion cannot be modeled anyway.1 The researcher is left with assuming diffusion
mechanisms and modeling the connection between different units based on these
assumptions.
The next sections put these theoretical considerations to an empirical test.
3.3 Data and Operationalizations
Our primary data source on hate crimes against refugees is the ARVIG dataset by
Benček and Strasheim (2016) which comprises 1 645 georeferenced events of anti-
1More technically, empirically modelling the connectivity between n units would at the least
require n(n 1)/2 observations. This is impossible except for the most trivial of cases. Therefore,
researchers must assume specific connections between units, geographic or otherwise.
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Table 3.1: Event counts of anti-refugee violence by type
Type N
Arson 165
Assault 233
Demonstration 468
Miscellaneous Attack 817
refugee violence and demonstrations in Germany between 1 January 2014 and 31
December 2015. The dataset distinguishes between four types of events: Arson at
refugee shelters, assault against refugees, right-wing demonstrations, and miscella-
neous attacks on refugee shelters. Among all events there are 62 that are attributed
tomore than one category, e.g. demonstrations during the course of which a refugee
was assaulted. For analytical tractability we split these multi-category events and at-
tribute them to each relevant category. As a result our data comprise 1 683 events.
Table 3.1 shows the overall frequencies of events for each category in our observa-
tion period and figure 3.1 depicts their cumulative counts over time.
While the overall number of events is high given that the observation period
only covers two years, the data may still represent an incomplete account of anti-
refugee violence in Germany. But since the dataset is based on information from
a large array of sources including official police statistics, parliamentary interpella-
tions, newspaper articles, as well as reports from organizations engaged with vic-
tims of right-wing violence, we do not assume any systematic selection bias with
regard to the time, region or type of violence.
The event-based nature of the data enable us to perform a highly disaggregated
analysis: While events are precise at the level of municipalities and days, such de-
tailed information is not available for the set of independent variables and we thus
choose districts across time as our unit of analysis. As there are 402 districts in Ger-
many this level of aggregation preserves sufficient regional variation to estimate
determinants of violence. The time dimension remains disaggregated by day, en-
abling us to capture the diffusion of violence between individual events.
Dependent Variable In order to be able to distinguish varying effects of local de-
terminants across the different types of violence against refugees, we initially es-
timate separate models for the categories arson, assault and miscellaneous attack.
Demonstrations are not included as a dependent variable since we focus on active
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Figure 3.1: Cumulative event counts during observation period
violence. They are, however, included as a potential source of diffusion as explained
below. Despite the large number of 1 215 violence events during the observation
period, the unit of analysis being district-days for each category leaves us with an
even larger number of zero-observations. More importantly, only few observations
have experienced more than one event of the same category. Event counts, while
highly interesting, would thus lack almost entirely in variance.2 Instead of a count
as the dependent variable we therefore choose a binary value indicating whether or
not at least one event of a given category has occured on a particular day in a given
district.
Diffusion As we are interested in the possible contagiousness of violence against
refugees, the general approach is to estimate the effect of individual events on the
likelihood of further violence. The dataset allows for a distinction of effects between
the four types of events. We furthermore use the dates and geospatial information
2Among the 293 460 observations (402 districts  730 days) there are in total 48 instances of
event counts larger than 1, the maximum of which is 4.
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to take into account the spatio-temporal distance between events. The different
approaches to operationalize diffusion are described inmore detail in the respective
subsections of section 3.4 below.
Independent Variables We use two measures in order to account for possible
socio-economic deprivation: the district-level disposable income per capita in 2012
(which is the latest data complete for all 402 districts) as well as the yearly average
rate of unemployment of each district for 2014 and 2015 (Statistische Ämter des
Bundes und der Länder, 2016d, 2016c). Based on the theoretical arguments pre-
sented above, deprivation in the form of a low disposable income and a high rate of
unemployment should increase the likelihood of violence against refugees.
The perceived level of labor market competition has probably increased to a
large extent during the observation period, driven by the unprecedented number
of refugees and asylum seekers that has arrived in Germany. We use monthly data
published by Eurostat (2016) that contain the number of first time asylum appli-
cants. Germany applies a strict quota system based on population shares and tax
base to distribute the total number of applicants between the federal states. This
enables us to determine the monthly increase in asylum seekers by state. The eth-
nic competition hypothesis suggests a positive relationship between the number of
asylum seekers and instances of violence against refugees.
We measure the level of previous contact with foreign nationals in each district
by the share of foreigners relative to the entire district population in 2013, i.e. the
year before the observation period (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder,
2016a). According to the contact hypothesis, more experience with foreigners (a
higher share) should reduce the chances of violence against refugees.
To account for regional differences in political preferences we use municipality-
level election data from the 2009 federal election. The results are aggregated to the
district level to determine vote percentages for all parties as well as the turnout rate
for each district. We expect a strong support for extremist right-wing parties to
increase the chances of violence against refugees. At the same time, a high voter
turnout, which we interpret as trust in political institutions, should reduce them.
Control Variables In spite of more than two decades of convergence since the re-
unification of Germany, East andWest are still distinctly different in many respects
such as political preferences, economic and social indicators. We therefore include
a dummy variable East to measure systematic differences that are not explained by
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other variables. We furthermore use the share of lower secondary school gradua-
tions in all graduations of 2014 to operationalize the average level of education in
each district (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder, 2016b). The district-
level population is also included to control for the fact that events of violence are
more likely to occur in regions with higher population. Finally, in order to control
for varying crime rates across districts, we draw on federal crime statistics as a ro-
bustness check of our results. The data distinguish between 40 different kinds of
criminal offences per 100 000 inhabitants (Bundeskriminalamt [BKA], 2015).
Table 3.2 gives an overview of all independent and control variables and lists
descriptive statistics. The different numbers of unique observations signal the level
of aggregation at which a particular variable is available. All variables withN = 402
vary between districts and withN = 804 also by year. Data on asylum applications
is state-level data on a monthly basis.
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of independent and control variables
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
log(Disp. Income) 402 9.900 0.126 9.631 10.594
Unemployment Rate 804 6.142 2.826 1.300 15.400
Unemployed Persons 804 7080.961 12 107.900 887 202 927
1st Time Asylum Applicants 384 1601.484 1860.947 95.744 12 330.490
Applicants per 100k
Inhabitants
384 32.660 18.354 12.221 85.784
Applicants per Unemployed 9648 0.838 1.105 0.003 10.171
Foreigner Share 402 7.079 4.611 0.860 31.271
NPD Votes 402 1.612 0.939 0.353 5.854
Grüne Votes 402 9.611 3.636 3.148 24.648
Turnout 402 66.006 7.068 49.723 80.046
log(Population) 402 11.957 0.655 10.437 15.046
Lower Sec. Education Share 402 17.558 5.572 7.239 43.292
East 402 0.192 0.394 0 1
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3.4 Empirical Modelling and Results
3.4.1 Simple Model: Capturing Spillovers
In a first step we approach possible predictors of violence against refugees by testing
existing hypotheses about local determinants for all three types of violence in our
dataset using a logistic regressionmodel. We then add variables to capture potential
spillovers from previous events depending on their spatio-temporal distance: For
this purpose we determine the number of events c; from category c that have
taken place during the  days prior to any given date from the observation period
and containedwithin the disc bi;r with radius r around the centroid of each district i.
The resulting model describing the odds of a given type of violence against refugees
is as follows:
log P (yc)
1  P (yc) = 0 + X +H; (3.1)
where X is a matrix of local determinants xi;t andH = (c; ) contains all counts of
potential sources of diffusion. Table 3.3 shows descriptive statistics for a selection
of these diffusion variables given a set of radii. All estimations were performed
with a temporal horizon of  = 14 days. The following subsections describe the
estimation results for each type of violence.
Arson
As the estimates in table 3.4 show, the odds of arson in East Germany are between 2
and 4 times higher than in West Germany across all models. This finding remains
robust nomatter which other characteristics are controlled for. With regard to local
determinants of arson, we find no evidence supporting the deprivation hypothesis:
Neither disposable income per capita nor the average rate of unemployment in a
district serve as significant predictors. Rising refugee numbers, however, strongly
increase the odds of arson. In line with the competition hypothesis the number
of first time asylum applicants per 100 000 inhabitants of a state has a significant
and positive effect. This result still holds when we interact the asylum applicants
with the economic situation in each district and use the number of applicants per
unemployed persons as a predictor: The odds of arson increase by 40% when the
measure rises one standard deviation above its mean. The only moderating effect
among the considered variables comes from the existing share of foreign nationals
living in a district, thus supporting the contact hypothesis.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics of diffusion variables
Type Radius N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Arson 10 293 058 0.004 0.074 0 5
Arson 50 293 058 0.070 0.331 0 5
Arson 100 293 058 0.227 0.625 0 8
Arson 200 293 058 0.727 1.329 0 12
Assault 10 293 058 0.007 0.091 0 4
Assault 50 293 058 0.070 0.310 0 8
Assault 100 293 058 0.247 0.631 0 10
Assault 200 293 058 0.866 1.430 0 14
Demonstration 10 293 058 0.015 0.155 0 7
Demonstration 50 293 058 0.182 0.686 0 13
Demonstration 100 293 058 0.567 1.408 0 23
Demonstration 200 293 058 1.824 3.039 0 35
Miscellaneous Attack 10 293 058 0.023 0.204 0 13
Miscellaneous Attack 50 293 058 0.323 0.909 0 15
Miscellaneous Attack 100 293 058 1.084 1.867 0 21
Miscellaneous Attack 200 293 058 3.541 4.238 0 35
As expected, political preferences seem to shape the encounters with refugees
– at least in negative ways: The percentage of votes cast for the right-wing extrem-
ist NPD serves as a strong predictor of arson. However, this result mainly reflects
differences in political preferences between East andWest Germany since the NPD
in general only receives high vote shares in the newly-formed federal states. NPD
vote percentages and the dummy variable for East Germany therefore exhibit an
extremely high correlation coefficient of 0:78. If we run the estimation separately
for East and West Germany, there is not sufficient variation in the predictor left
to produce any significant effect. Other political preference variables such as the
percentage of Green Party votes or the turnout in the 2009 federal election do not
influence the odds of arson in any significant way.
Using the significant local determinants we finally estimate a diffusion model
which includesmeasures for each type of event within a radius of 10 kilometers (see
figure 3.2 below for the variation of estimates under an increasing radius). This
shows that arson tends to take place in clusters as the number of previous arson
attacks serves as the most influential predictor. But besides that, assault also in-
creases the odds of arson significantly. Demonstrations and miscellaneous attacks
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Table 3.4: Logit estimations of arson
Baseline Deprivation Competition I Competition II Contact Preferences Diffusion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log(Population) 0:958 1:005 0:881 1:051 1:404 1:647 1:289
(0:067) (0:080) (0:058) (0:078) (0:138) (0:142) (0:141)
LSE-Share  0:020  0:024  0:027  0:038  0:033  0:039  0:033
(0:022) (0:023) (0:022) (0:022) (0:019) (0:019) (0:019)
East 1:217 1:288 1:153 1:290 0:806 0:705
(0:217) (0:267) (0:165) (0:267) (0:269) (0:257)
log(Disp. Income)  0:534 0:327  0:290
(1:383) (0:929) (1:126)
Unemployment Rate  0:059
(0:062)
Applicants per 100k Inhabitants 0:040
(0:007)
Applicants per Unemployed 0:348 0:365 0:405 0:344
(0:059) (0:059) (0:065) (0:058)
Foreigner Share  0:105  0:072  0:110
(0:032) (0:034) (0:033)
NPD Votes 0:228
(0:121)
Grüne Votes  0:056
(0:042)
Turnout  0:020
(0:016)
Arson (10km) 1:223
(0:121)
Assault (10km) 0:565
(0:188)
Demonstration (10km) 0:171
(0:157)
Misc. Attack (10km)  0:165
(0:149)
Constant  19:249  14:098  22:959  17:486  23:946  25:389  22:495
(0:807) (13:673) (9:120) (11:119) (1:452) (1:708) (1:497)
N 293460 293460 293460 293460 293460 293460 293058
Log-likelihood  1300:87  1299:94  1246:12  1294:09  1286:93  1282:18  1267:23
AIC 2609:74 2611:88 2504:25 2600:17 2585:86 2580:35 2554:46
Pseudo R2 0:066 0:066 0:105 0:071 0:076 0:079 0:09
p< .1; p< .05; p< .01
on refugee shelters, by contrast, do not induce subsequent arson.
Assault
Concerning the effects of local determinants, our estimation for assault exhibits the
same dynamics as the arson model. In support of the competition hypothesis, ris-
ing numbers of asylum applicants increase the odds of violence against refugees.
Indicators of socio-economic deprivation, in contrast, do not explain the observed
regional variance in assault patterns. As before, a more diverse population reduces
the odds of violence, while again regions with strong support for the right-wing
extremist NPD exhibit significantly higher odds. A higher rate of political partici-
pation, in turn, reduces the odds of assault. The fact that Green Party vote shares
are also a positive influence for more assault shows how ubiquitous assault against
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Table 3.5: Logit estimations of assault
Baseline Deprivation Competition I Competition II Contact Preferences Diffusion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log(Population) 0:916 0:968 0:880 0:989 1:313 1:658 1:217
(0:126) (0:163) (0:132) (0:141) (0:186) (0:176) (0:153)
LSE-Share  0:073  0:071  0:077  0:086  0:071  0:101  0:061
(0:049) (0:046) (0:060) (0:049) (0:043) (0:039) (0:035)
East 2:313 2:139 2:102 2:262 2:031 1:953
(0:228) (0:350) (0:205) (0:356) (0:303) (0:293)
log(Disp. Income)  2:108  0:752  1:478
(2:171) (1:746) (1:502)
Unemployment Rate  0:067
(0:090)
Applicants per 100k Inhabitants 0:025
(0:002)
Applicants per Unemployed 0:425 0:423 0:378 0:387
(0:089) (0:094) (0:106) (0:086)
Foreigner Share  0:105  0:238  0:109
(0:036) (0:080) (0:035)
NPD Votes 0:348
(0:115)
Grüne Votes 0:131
(0:068)
Turnout  0:050
(0:016)
Arson (10km) 0:043
(0:524)
Assault (10km) 0:699
(0:150)
Demonstration (10km) 0:195
(0:097)
Misc. Attack (10km) 0:037
(0:066)
Constant  18:352 2:323  11:247  4:700  22:739  23:489  21:667
(1:377) (21:044) (17:523) (14:707) (1:830) (2:015) (1:556)
N 293460 293460 293460 293460 293460 293460 293058
Log-likelihood  1594:21  1592:63  1565:44  1586:63  1581:23  1596:83  1567:1
AIC 3196:43 3197:25 3142:87 3185:26 3174:46 3209:66 3154:2
Pseudo R2 0:143 0:144 0:159 0:147 0:15 0:142 0:158
p< .1; p< .05; p< .01
refugees has been during the observation period. Nevertheless, the east dummy
has an even higher estimated effect than in the arson model: It is between 8 and 15
times more likely to observe assault in East Germany.
The diffusion of events within a small radius of 10 kilometers is only significant
for other instances of assault. Other types of events do not exert any influence on
the odds of assault. Only if we expand the region of potential influence beyond
about 50 kilometers will miscellaneous attacks on refugee shelters start to have a
small but significant and positive effect (see figure 3.2 below).
Miscellaneous Attacks
Miscellaneous attacks on refugee shelters (examples of which include rocks and
firework thrown at the buildings, xenophobic graffiti etc.) can be predicted just
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Table 3.6: Logit estimations of miscellaneous attacks on refugee shelters
Baseline Deprivation Competition I Competition II Contact Preferences Diffusion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log(Population) 1:040 1:107 1:010 1:101 1:372 1:597 1:237
(0:034) (0:046) (0:047) (0:047) (0:075) (0:104) (0:076)
LSE-Share 0:001  0:004  0:002  0:012  0:007  0:018  0:008
(0:015) (0:015) (0:025) (0:015) (0:014) (0:013) (0:013)
East 1:502 1:547 1:495 1:555 1:181 0:997
(0:112) (0:183) (0:326) (0:173) (0:135) (0:139)
log(Disp. Income)  1:051 0:223  0:213
(0:820) (1:034) (0:621)
Unemployment Rate  0:082
(0:035)
Applicants per 100k Inhabitants 0:020
(0:003)
Applicants per Unemployed 0:272 0:277 0:273 0:239
(0:036) (0:038) (0:043) (0:036)
Foreigner Share  0:079  0:082  0:086
(0:019) (0:024) (0:020)
NPD Votes 0:358
(0:063)
Grüne Votes  0:008
(0:026)
Turnout  0:008
(0:009)
Arson (10km) 0:175
(0:221)
Assault (10km) 0:369
(0:120)
Demonstration (10km) 0:358
(0:114)
Misc. Attack (10km) 0:244
(0:054)
Constant  19:159  8:988  21:669  17:776  22:645  24:940  20:881
(0:497) (7:999) (10:248) (6:035) (0:815) (1:254) (0:837)
N 293460 293460 293460 293460 293460 293460 293058
Log-likelihood  4880:73  4873:13  4818:07  4865:62  4846:29  4849:59  4791:3
AIC 9769:47 9758:25 9648:14 9743:25 9704:59 9715:18 9602:61
Pseudo R2 0:1 0:101 0:111 0:103 0:106 0:106 0:116
p< .1; p< .05; p< .01
as well as arson and assault events using the same local determinants. One minor
difference concerns the effect of a district’s unemployment rate: While it had no
significant influence on arson and assault, the odds of miscellaneous attacks seem
to be slightly reduced in high-unemployment districts. This result is in contrast to
the deprivation hypothesis, which predicts a positive effect.
As for the other event types, a rising number of first time asylum applicants (per
state and per unemployed persons in the district) increases the odds of an event;
East Germany (which is synonymous with regions where the right-wing extremist
NPD receives a higher percentage of votes) again experiences higher chances of
violence.
Our estimated diffusion effects show that the inhibition threshold for miscella-
neous attacks is lower than for the other types of events: Previous incidences of as-
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sault, miscellaneous attacks and demonstrations increase the odds ofmiscellaneous
attacks on shelters. Only arson does not seem to exert any influence – it seems likely
that perpetrators tend to let the dust settle after arson attacks which gain relatively
more attention by criminal investigators as well as the media.
Summary
This first step in our analysis to disentangle local determinants and diffusion effects
of violence against refugees already produces a variety of results, confirming prior
empirical research and adding new insights by being able to distinguish between
different types of violence. The deprivation hypothesis does not receive much sup-
port in existing research (see e.g. Koopmans & Olzak, 2004) and our findings are
no different for all types of violence. Contrary to theoretical expectations, a higher
unemployment rate even reduces the odds of an event for miscellaneous attacks.
We find diffusion effects to pose a significant role, especially whithin the same
category of violence (i.e. arson leads to more arson etc.). Assault has the broadest
influence on violence as it affects all types of events. Miscellaneous attacks, on the
other hand, are the most susceptible form of violence as prior events of assault, mis-
cellaneous attacks as well as demonstrations against refugees increase their odds.
Our estimates of diffusion effects are based on influence regions of only 10 kilo-
meters. In order to check the robustness of our findings, we have also run the dif-
fusion models for larger radii ranging from 10 to 200 kilometers. The change in
estimates for all types of prior events is depicted in figure 3.2. From the top left
tile the tendency of arson to appear in clusters can be seen very clearly. Assault, in
the second column, exerts a positive and significant influence on all types of events
within a radius up to about 100 kilometers. As can be expected, diffusion effects
generally vanish as the influence region is expanded.
Further checking the robustness of our findings, we also estimate the diffusion
model while additionally controlling for other instances of crime within each dis-
trict. Using regional data from federal crime statistics we can distinguish between
40 different types of criminal offences. Surprisingly, none of them have a positive
and significant impact on the odds of any type of violence against refugees (see
figure 3.3 in the appendix). Some exhibit a significant but small negative effect
while the majority is simply insignificant. All previously observed effects remain
unchanged. This suggests that the analyzed cases of anti-refugee attacks are not an
expression of usual criminal activity.
As a last robustness check, we re-estimate the diffusion model using month-
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Figure 3.2: Estimated diffusion effect depending on the distance of included events (with 95%
confidence interval)
based time dummies to make sure not to bias the estimations with an underlying
time trend in the data. Since the division into calender months is rather arbitrary,
we use a rolling time window of 30 days and report average effects and standard
errors in table 3.9. The most important difference here is the loss of significance
in the asylum applications per unemployed person. This variable seems to have
captured the time trend of rising violence against refugees accompanying the arrival
of more and more asylum seekers rather than actual labor market competition.
So far, for analytical simplicity, we have not considered any temporal decay
of diffusion but instead opted for treating all events within 14 days prior to any
given date equally. In the following part of the analysis we therefore turn to a
spatio-temporal regressionmodel to better capture the diffusion of violence against
refugees.
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3.4.2 Spatio-Temporal Lag Model
Our econometric modelling has so far followed an intuitive approach combining
widely-used local determinants of right-wing violence with simple, manual counts
of prior events within a certain distance around the analyzed unit. As shown above,
these diffusion variables help explain the patterns of different types of violence
present in our data. In order to better capture the spatio-temporal dynamics of
diffusion, however, we can apply more advanced methods that specifically incor-
porate a spatial and temporal lag of the dependent variable. During the past two
decades a lot of research has explored the benefits of spatial-econometric models
for the social sciences (see e.g. Goodchild, Anselin, Appelbaum, & Harthorn, 2000;
Ward & Gleditsch, 2002; Anselin, 2003; Franzese & Hays, 2007; Beck, Gleditsch, &
Beardsley, 2006).
We follow Franzese and Hays (2007) in formulating the model
y = 
y+ X + ; (3.2)
whereX holds the observations of previously determined significant local variables,
the effect of which will be estimated by . The binary dependent variable y is or-
dered by time periods and units: TheN first-period observations are stacked onto
the N second-period ones and so on. This way the spatio-temporal lag matrix 

can be expressed as the Kronecker product (DT 
WN) of a T  T temporal de-
cay matrix D and anN N spatial-weights matrix. We constructWN as a binary
contiguity matrix where wij = 1 if units i and j share at least one common bor-
der point and wij = 0 otherwise. Because we want to account for effects by prior
events within the same district, units are also connected to themselves and diagonal
entries wii = 1. We then additionally row-standardize WN so each row sums to
unity.
In the temporal decaymatrixDT entries dij determine the discounted temporal
influence of period j on period i according to some function f(l) of the temporal
lag l = j   i, with f(l  0) = 0 and @f(l)/@l > 0. Same-period observations
therefore do not exert any influence by assumption. We thus also omit problems of
contemporaneous observations and biased estimates much like Beck et al. (2006).
Although Franzese and Hays (2007) note that there are better ways to handle endo-
geneity concerns, due to our high level of temporal disaggregation, it is not only a
modelling decision but theoretically more sensible for us to exclude same-period
influence: In contrast to more frequently used annual data, daily observations can
hardly exhibit diffusion effects within the same time period.
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The spatio-temporal autoregressive coefficient  to be estimated thus gives us
the extent of diffusion between violence events against refugees. Since we want to
distinguish between effects from different categories of violence c, we estimate the
model
y =
X
c
c
yc + X +  (3.3)
for each  2 c. In order to assess the temporal diffusion of violence, estimations
were performed using three variants of the sigmoid temporal decay function
f(l) =
(
el d
1+el d ; if l < 0
0; otherwise
(3.4)
setting the inflection point at l = d to be at 7, 14 and 28 days and thus broadening
the temporal window of diffusion from one to four weeks.
With regard to local determinants of violence, the results of the spatio-temporal
lag model in table 3.7 generally match our estimations from above with two notable
exceptions: (i) For the case of arson, systematic differences between East and West
Germany have disappeared and the correspondent dummy variable is not signifi-
cant. We interpret this result to show that arson is a nation-wide phenomenon and
the spatio-temporal lag better explains its regional patterns. Assault and miscella-
neous attacks on the other hand are still more prevalent in East Germany. (ii) The
share of foreign nationals per district does not affect assault anymore and only sig-
nificantly reduces the odds of arson and miscellaneous attacks on refugee shelters.
This is likely the result of unit dummies at the state level, which significantly reduce
the observed variance in foreign nationals – especially in East Germany, where
a large share of the recorded assault occured. Despite the additional inclusion of
monthly time dummies, the spatio-temporal lag model still shows a significant ef-
fect of the number of first time asylum applicants per unemployed person for all
types of violence. Thus, even controlling for the joint time trend of asylum applica-
tions and violence against refugees, the competition hypothesis receives support in
our model.
Based on the different temporal decay functions we can now capture the dif-
fusion of violence more clearly: First of all, auto-diffusion between events of the
same type is still strong and its effect decreases over time. Assault remains the most
influential type of violence against refugees, increasing the odds of all event types
(with the largest effects within the first week after an incidence). What we had not
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seen before, however, is the positive effect of demonstrations on the odds of ar-
son. Right-wing demonstrations appear to induce arson attacks within the ensuing
week. Demonstrations also have such a short-term effect on miscellaneous attacks.
In both cases, we can imagine that demonstration participants, being reinforced in
their beliefs, decide to turn their words into actions.
Unlike in our first specification, arson increases the odds not only of further
arson. Miscellaneous attacks also become more likely, however not until at least
one week has passed after an arson attack. This delayed effect supports our previous
assessment that arson tends to induce (potential) perpetrators to seek cover.
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Table 3.7: Spatio-temporal lag estimations
arson assault miscellaneous attack
d = 7 d = 14 d = 28 d = 7 d = 14 d = 28 d = 7 d = 14 d = 28
log(Population) 1:398 1:386 1:376 1:269 1:257 1:235 1:024 1:014 0:996
(0:222) (0:223) (0:223) (0:209) (0:210) (0:211) (0:107) (0:107) (0:107)
LSE-Share 0:006 0:008 0:009  0:035  0:034  0:032 0:018 0:019 0:020
(0:029) (0:029) (0:029) (0:028) (0:028) (0:028) (0:013) (0:013) (0:013)
East 0:951 0:965 0:921 1:497 1:506 1:484 1:316 1:316 1:320
(0:651) (0:651) (0:651) (0:682) (0:682) (0:682) (0:346) (0:346) (0:347)
Applicants per Unemployed 0:414 0:410 0:410 0:332 0:331 0:330 0:193 0:191 0:185
(0:117) (0:118) (0:119) (0:126) (0:127) (0:128) (0:066) (0:066) (0:067)
Foreigner Share  0:083  0:083  0:084  0:018  0:016  0:015  0:063  0:063  0:062
(0:035) (0:035) (0:035) (0:037) (0:037) (0:037) (0:016) (0:016) (0:016)
Arson (lag) 3:254 2:085 1:786  1:889  0:184 0:311 0:743 1:022 0:713
(0:871) (0:691) (0:505) (1:313) (0:717) (0:469) (0:637) (0:402) (0:293)
Assault (lag) 2:184 1:300 0:566 2:314 1:131 0:797 1:404 0:719 0:579
(0:772) (0:521) (0:430) (0:556) (0:411) (0:317) (0:440) (0:296) (0:218)
Demonstration (lag) 1:736 0:524 0:472 0:638 0:184 0:216 0:987 0:398 0:090
(0:660) (0:463) (0:291) (0:518) (0:346) (0:218) (0:334) (0:220) (0:143)
Misc. Attack (lag) 0:092 0:659 0:379 1:129 0:801 0:292 1:799 1:164 0:790
(0:697) (0:434) (0:293) (0:449) (0:300) (0:208) (0:274) (0:188) (0:129)
Constant  24:907  24:812  24:664  23:336  23:234  22:929  19:381  19:284  19:071
(2:805) (2:811) (2:821) (2:621) (2:626) (2:631) (1:354) (1:356) (1:359)
N 293,460 293,460 293,460 293,460 293,460 293,460 293,460 293,460 293,460
Log-likelihood -1,234.008 -1,232.902 -1,230.966 -1,535.497 -1,538.715 -1,539.655 -4,710.104 -4,706.359 -4,701.990
AIC 2,538.016 2,535.803 2,531.932 3,140.993 3,147.429 3,149.310 9,490.209 9,482.717 9,473.979
Pseudo R2 0:886 0:886 0:884 0:825 0:827 0:828 0:869 0:868 0:867
p< .1; p< .05; p< .01
All regressions include fixed time and unit effects (month and federal state). Their coefficient estimates are omitted here to conserve space.
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3.4.3 Methodological Extension: Infectious Violence
While spatial-econometric methods have been receiving growing attention in the
social sciences, we can still benefit from models and applications originally devel-
oped in other disciplines. For example, researchers from geophysics (Guo & Ogata,
1997; Ogata, 1999), criminology (e.g. Weisburd & Green, 1995; Ratcliffe, 2004;
Johnson, Bowers, Birks, & Pease, 2009) or biostatistics (e.g. Neal & Roberts, 2004;
Diggle, Kaimi, & Abellana, 2010) have already been more involved with geocoded
data and spatio-temporal processes. Regardless of whether the research subject
is earthquake patterns, residential burglaries or infectious disease outbreaks – the
underlying statistical framework is the theory of point processes (for an overview
cf. Daley & Vere-Jones, 2003). This framework is particularly useful for analyz-
ing so-called epidemic phenomena, i.e. spatio-temporal processes that exhibit “self-
exciting” behaviour. From this perspective, our event dataset containing individual
occurrences of anti-refugee violence is not much different from data of a measles
outbreak. So even though Meyer et al. (2012) explain observed patterns of invasive
meningococcal disease, we can apply their “unifying regression framework […] for
the modelling, inference and simulation of spatio-temporal point processes” to our
data and model the spread of different types of violence against refugees.
Meyer et al.’s (2012) two-component spatio-temporal intensitymodel (twinstim)
is continuous in time and space which allows us to dispense with discrete units of
observation for our dependent variable (i.e. days and districts). We can instead
treat each event, identified in space by its geographical coordinates and in time by
its occurence date, as realizations of a point process within the entirety of Germany
during the two-year observation period. At the same time, we can still include
independent and control variables that are necessarily based on some discretization
of space and time. Furthermore, twinstim allows for a joint analysis of all events,
irrespective of their category. Unlike in the previous models, it is therefore not
necessary to perform separate estimations for the different types of violence in the
dataset.
Using an epidemic perspective to describe patterns of anti-refugee violence lets
us approach the topic in a slightly different manner than before and thus gain ad-
ditional insights: So far we have been looking for evidence that these events are
not solely based on local determinants and also interact and promote one another.
Therefore, we have not only considered the spatial clustering of our observations
but also included their temporal structure which combination has allowed us to
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trace their diffusion processes.3 Having thus established the mechanisms and di-
rections of influence among the different types of violence, we can now go one step
further and use the epidemic perspective in order to assess how “infectious” dif-
ferent types of events really are. For this purpose, the twinstim uses a conditional
intensity function that estimates the hazard for events from category k at time t and
location s:
(s; t; k) = [s][t] +
X
j2I(s;t;k)
jf(ks  sjk j kj)g(t  tj j kj) (3.5)
The first part of the model, which represents the endemic component, reflects
the occurence of new events caused by local determinants that affect the risk of an
observation – in our case variables such as population, the share of foreigners or
the number of first time asylum applicants. These make up the log-linear predictor
[s][t] covering the entire spatio-temporal grid indexed by [s][t].
The second part of themodel is the epidemic component which accounts for the
“infection pressure” frompast events that occurredwithin themaximum spatial and
temporal ranges  and  , respectively. Their set is defined as
I(s; t; k) = fj : tj < t ^ t  tj   ^ ks  sjk   ^ qkj ;k = 1g: (3.6)
In order to model spatio-temporal interaction, Meyer et al. (2012) follow an ap-
proach by Lawson and Leimich (2000) and use parametric interaction functions
f() and g(), which can be specified depending on the respective application.
Since we distinguish betweenK = 4 different event types that belong to the set
K = f1; : : : ; Kg, we also need an indicator matrixQ = (qk;l)k;l2K, where elements
qk;l 2 f0; 1g denote possible transmissions between types. For example, assuming
that all four types of events (arson, assault, demonstration, miscellaneous attack)
can influence one another, Q would be a 4  4 matrix of ones. In contrast to in-
fectious diseases, we cannot know with certainty which type of event causes which
others to occur. Infectivity in the social sciences is unfortunately a more ambigu-
ous concept compared to epidemiology. However, we can still make an informed
decision based on theory as well as our empirical results from the models above:
3Diffusion necessarily requires the temporal alongside the spatial dimensions. This is why a
statistic like Moran’s I is not sufficient to assess the existence and scope of diffusion, as it only con-
siders spatial correlations. It does, however, serve as a first indicator: Within each event category,
Moran’s I is 0.12, 0.31, 0.18 and 0.20 for arson, assault, demonstrations andmiscellaneous attacks, re-
spectively (with an expected valueE(I) =  0:0025 for all of them and highly significant p-values).
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For one, we do not try to describe the occurence of demonstrations and it would
not make any sense to claim that an arson attack causes subsequent anti-refugee
demonstrations. So demonstrations should merely be based on local determinants,
the effects of which are modelled by the endemic component. Miscellaneous at-
tacks on the other hand turn out to be strongly influenced by previous events of all
categories (with arson having a delayed positive effect). Analogously, assault is only
affected by prior assault (potentially miscellaneous attacks) and arson is influenced
by previous arson, assault and possibly within the short term also by demonstra-
tions.
The model is applied to our right-wing violence event data using the R pack-
age “surveillance” (Höhle, Meyer, & Paul, 2016). In order to select an appropriate
model, we useAIC to compare permutations of the following specifications: As part
of the endemic component we include local variables which were found to have a
significant impact in the estimations above. In addition, we test a common and
a violence type-specific intercept as well as a linear time trend that could account
for a baseline increase in violence during the observation period. The epidemic
component considers only the type of violence for each event. If we had more in-
formation to characterize individual events (e.g. some kind of measure of severity
or the number of perpetrators), we could include it here as well to draw even more
subtle inferences about their infectivity.
As the twinstim is computationally intensive, we restrict a first set of estimations
to a constant spatial interaction function f and only assume a step-wise temporal
interaction function with one knot. Afterwards, the AIC-wise best specification
is additionally estimated using two versions of a Gaussian distance-decay f(x) =
exp( x2/22), one with a fixed variance parameter at 40 km and one at 80 km.
Table 3.8 shows the parameter estimates of the resulting best-fit model. The su-
periority of a type-specific intercept in the endemic component reflects the high
variance of observation numbers across event types (as shown in table 3.1 above).
As in all models above, the dummy variable for East Germany has a strong and posi-
tive effect on the chances of right-wing extremist events. Despite the significance of
an upward linear time trend, rising labor market competition from increasing asy-
lum applicants numbers per unemployed still increases the odds of an event. In this
respect, the twinstim and the spatio-temporal lag model seem to be better suited to
disentangle both effects in comparison with the simple spill-over logit model.
Different fromour priormodels, the share of foreign nationals actually increases
chances of an event. The most likely cause for this result is the fact that we now
include demonstrations as a type of event to be explained – which have taken place
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Table 3.8: Twinstim parameter estimates
Estimate Std. Error z value P (jZj > jzj)
Intercept (Arson) −25.762 0.590 −43.686 < 1  10 04
Intercept (Assault) −25.631 0.583 −43.963 < 1  10 04
Intercept (Demonstration) −24.179 0.561 −43.108 < 1  10 04
Intercept (Misc. Attack) −24.040 0.575 −41.813 < 1  10 04
log(Population) 0.727 0.048 15.013 < 1  10 04
Applicants per Unemployed 0.151 0.058 2.629 0:00857
Foreigner Share 0.154 0.012 13.200 < 1  10 04
East 2.170 0.110 19.783 < 1  10 04
LSE-Share −0.048 0.010 −5.044 < 1  10 04
Time Trend 1.355 0.121 11.186 < 1  10 04
(Intercept) −12.947 0.179 −72.332 < 1  10 04
Assault −1.281 0.374 −3.429 0:000606
Demonstration −3.020 0.941 −3.209 0:001330
Misc. Attack −0.476 0.190 −2.510 0:012089
log 3.690 0.065
1 −1.290 0.235
N 1683
AIC 44469
Log-likelihood -22219
Note: Estimates are shown for the endemic (top) and epidemic (middle) components of the model with Gaussian spatial
interaction function and a temporal step function.
mostly in Berlin and other large cities with significantly higher shares of foreigners
among their population.
Adding an epidemic intercept improves the fit compared to an endemic-only
model: Therefore the point process seems to be self-exciting, i.e. violence against
refugees is infectious. As arson serves as the reference category in the epidemic
component, we can see that all other types of events are less infectious. Since we
assume assault to be a potential source of arson, miscellaneous attacks and other
assault, the number of potential offspring events is larger than for the other types.
As a consequence, its infectivity is estimated to be 30% relative to arson. Miscel-
leaneous attacks are about twice as infectious as assault. Demonstrations are the
least infectious types of events. As we have seen in the spatio-temporal lag model
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above, their influence on subsequent events is weak and short-lived. But since their
absolute number is relatively high, their effect on further acts against refugees must
not be overlooked.
In addition to these estimates, the model allows for calculating event-specific
reproduction numbers, which tell us themean number of secondary events for each
type of anti-refugee event. Arson shows the highest number of secondary infections
withar = 0:6, followed bymiscellaneous attacks (ma = 0:38), assault (as = 0:27)
and demonstrations (de = 0:03). So while we have seen almost five times as many
miscellaneous attacks in the observation period as arson attacks, the latter carry
an enormous potential for further aggression – especially considering that we have
shown the within-type diffusion effects of arson to be particularly strong.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed potential determinants of different types of right-wing vio-
lence against refugees. Building on prior research, we have not only included local
conditions as potential explanatory variables but focused particularly on spill-over
effects between individual hate crime events. We have found support for the compe-
tition hypothesis, according to which a combination of high perceived immigration
pressure and unfavorable economic conditions evoke violence. However, the most
important local predictor of anti-refugee violence remains the dummy variable for
East Germany. Even more than 25 year after the reunification of Germany, there
still seem to exist fundamental differences between East and West with respect to
social norms and political preferences.
Carefully and gradually constructing our econometric toolkit, the presented
spatio-temporal models have shown strong evidence of diffusion among the differ-
ent types of events. Assault exhibits the broadest influence on subsequent violence
as it affects all types of events. Miscellaneous attacks, on the other hand, are the
most susceptible form of violence as prior events of all types exert a positive influ-
ence.
This paper has also offered a methodological contribution to the analysis of
event data in political science: Adopting a point process model from epidemiology,
we could assess the contagiousness of the different types of events covered by the
dataset. It has shown the danger of arson attacks as they evoke the highest number
of secondary events. Generally, point process modelling is particularly well-suited
for event data, which is increasingly being collected. The continuous space-time
76 CHAPTER 3. ANTI-REFUGEE VIOLENCE
structure and the scalability of the model should provide further benefits in mul-
tiple applications. With more detailed and more current data, simulations of the
spread of violence beyond the present may even serve as tools to assess the risk of
future violence within well-defined geographical regions.
Our findings show that events of right-wing extremist violence do not constitute
crime as any other, they also carry a message and represent “propaganda of the
deed”. Thus stopping andprosecuting anti-refugee violence not only protects people
locally but inhibits the spread of right-wing extremist behaviour throughout society.
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Appendix
3.A Additional Material
Table 3.9: Diffusion model with rolling time fixed effects (by month)
arson assault miscellaneous attack
log(Population) 1.246 1.201 1.218
(0.139) (0.159) (0.075)
LSE-Share −0.011 −0.054 0.003
(0.02) (0.037) (0.013)
East 0.682 1.9 0.998
(0.239) (0.284) (0.132)
Applicants per Unemployed 0.005 0.186 0.059
(0.092) (0.12) (0.051)
Foreigner Share −0.101 −0.104 −0.082
(0.031) (0.034) (0.019)
Arson (10km) 1.24 0.08 0.219
(0.093) (0.433) (0.222)
Assault (10km) 0.286 0.547 0.217
(0.269) (0.157) (0.084)
Demonstration (10km) 0.142 0.082 0.335
(0.207) (0.12) (0.072)
Misc. Attack (10km) −0.296 0.055 0.219
(0.214) (0.069) (0.029)
Constant −23.917 −24.175 −22.786
(1.55) (1.879) (0.949)
N 293058 293058 293058
Log-likelihood -1191.242 -1528.799 -4613.826
AIC 2450.226 3125.341 9295.395
p< .1; p< .05; p< .01
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Figure 3.3: Estimated effect of criminal offences in a baseline model of local determinants.
Offences were included individually, definition of crime IDs in table 3.10.
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Table 3.10: Definitions of crime identifiers
Crime ID Description
overall Straftaten insgesamt
111000 Vergewaltigung und sexuelle Nötigung §§ 177 Abs. 2, 3 und 4, 178 StGB
210000 Raub, räuberische Erpressung und räuberischer Angriff auf Kraftfahrer §§ 249-252,
255, 316a StGB
211000 Raub, räuberische Erpressung auf/gegen Geldinstitute, Postfilialen und -agenturen
212000 Raub, räuberische Erpressung auf/gegen sonstige Zahlstellen und Geschäfte
216000 Handtaschenraub
217000 Sonstige Raubüberfälle auf Straßen, Wegen oder Plätzen
219000 Raubüberfälle in Wohnungen
222000 Gefährliche und schwere Körperverletzung, Verstümmelung weiblicher Genitalien
§§ 224, 226, 226a, 231 StGB
224000 Vorsätzliche einfache Körperverletzung § 223 StGB
3***00 Diebstahl ohne erschwerende Umstände §§ 242, 247, 248a-c StGB und zwar:
326*00 Einfacher Ladendiebstahl
4***00 Diebstahl unter erschwerenden Umständen §§ 243-244a StGB und zwar:
435*00 Wohnungseinbruchdiebstahl § 244 Abs. 1 Nr. 3 StGB darunter:
436*00 Tageswohnungseinbruch
****00 Diebstahl insgesamt und zwar:
***100 Diebstahl insgesamt von Kraftwagen einschl. unbefugte Ingebrauchnahme
***200 Diebstahl insgesamt von Mopeds und Krafträdern einschl. unbefugte
Ingebrauchnahme
***300 Diebstahl insgesamt von Fahrrädern einschl. unbefugte Ingebrauchnahme
*50*00 Diebstahl insgesamt an/aus Kraftfahrzeugen
*90*00 Taschendiebstahl insgesamt
510000 Betrug §§ 263, 263a, 264, 264a, 265, 265a, 265b StGB
515000 Erschleichen von Leistungen § 265a StGB
515001 Beförderungserschleichung
530000 Unterschlagung §§ 246, 247, 248a StGB
540000 Urkundenfälschung §§ 267-271, 273-279, 281 StGB
621020 Widerstand gegen Vollstreckungsbeamte
621021 Widerstand gegen Polizeivollzugsbeamte
630000 Begünstigung, Strafvereitelung (ohne Strafvereitelung im Amt), Hehlerei und
Geldwäsche §§ 257, 258, 259-261 StGB
640000 Brandstiftung und Herbeiführen einer Brandgefahr §§ 306-306d, 306f StGB
674000 Sachbeschädigung §§ 303-305a StGB
725000 Straftaten gegen das Aufenthalts-, das Asylverfahrens- und das
Freizügigkeitsgesetz/EU
730000 Rauschgiftdelikte (soweit nicht bereits mit anderer Schlüsselzahl erfasst)
892000 Gewaltkriminalität
892500 Mord und Totschlag
897000 Computerkriminalität
899000 Straßenkriminalität
899500 Sachbeschädigung durch Graffiti insgesamt
972500 Unerlaubt eingereiste/aufhältige Personen (SZ: 725100, 725700)
980100 IuK-Kriminalität im engeren Sinne (SZ: 517500, 517900, 543000, 674200, 678000)
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Chapter 4
Message Received: Analyzing
Determinants of SMO Mobilization
on Twitter
David Benček
4.1 Introduction
During recent years, online campaigns by social movements and non-stateorganizations have grown to be a firm pillar of their mobilization strate-gies. Just one example is the social media presence pursued by the “Islamic
State” (IS), which has gained worldwide attention. Through an extensive and well-
coordinated presence on various social media platforms, including Twitter, IS has
managed to spread its propaganda effectively among followers and also seems to be
successful in constantly mobilizing new members (Klausen, 2015). Of course, nei-
ther is the use of electronic communication inmobilization efforts limited to armed
movements, nor is it an entirely new phenomenon and as such it has already fueled
research in the past. However, most of it has focused either on the opportunities of
online mobilization for social movement organizations (SMOs) (e.g. Diani, 2000;
Ward, Gibson, & Lusoli, 2003; Stein, 2009) or the identities of online addressees
(e.g. Krueger, 2006). So in spite of its steady proliferation, little is so far known
about the precise mechanisms by which SMOs attract and mobilize followers via
social media and whether or how they differ from traditional (offline) channels.
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In order to address this gap in the literature, this paper develops an empirical
approach to examine determinants of successful online mobilization efforts. This
approach is demonstrated by analyzing the communication within extended Twit-
ter networks of six SMOs across the environmental and nuclear disarmamentmove-
ments. Methodologically, this paper advances previous research on SMO mobi-
lization by combining different building blocks such as automated data collection,
computational content analysis and instruments from social network analysis into
a general regression framework. Future applications to other cases are facilitated
by this modular framework, thereby also contributing to the growing field of com-
putational social sciences.
The outlined approach allows for an empirical analysis of two distinct factors
that determine success ofmobilization: themessage and themessenger. The former
is rooted in research on traditional mobilization mechanisms in the social psycho-
logical literature that emphasizes the content of communication (e.g. Klandermans,
1984; Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986; Gamson & Meyer, 1996; Good-
win, 2004) as well as insights from modern communication theory (e.g. Stieglitz &
Dang-Xuan, 2013; Hansen, Arvidsson, Nielsen, Colleoni, & Etter, 2011); the latter
comes from a strand of the social movement literature that analyzes the role of net-
works and social ties in the way SMOs attract their members (e.g. McAdam, 1986;
McAdam & Paulsen, 1993; Passy, 2003; Diani, 2013). Based on collected data, suc-
cess of SMO mobilization in social media is operationalized in terms of two vari-
ables: (i) the popularity of messages and (ii) the distance of their dissemination
throughout the extended networks.
The findings presented in this paper show that widespread popularity of mes-
sages is almost exclusively determined by their content. On the other hand, the
reach of messages, measured by the distance of their dissemination throughout the
network, barely depends on themessage itself. Instead it is essential for amessenger
to be highly visible and well connected in order to reach distant network members.
A comprehensive online mobilization strategy therefore needs to balance these di-
mensions and spread messages among distinct and well-connected hubs through-
out a communications network.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section two begins by
briefly reviewing previous research on offline and online SMO mobilization strate-
gies, laying out the framework for the subsequent analysis. Section three presents
the case selection, the strategy for building the dataset and descriptive statistics. Sec-
tion four describes the analysis and discusses its results. The final section concludes
with outlining avenues for future research.
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4.2 Literature and Framework
Mobilization processes have been researched extensively for several decades. A
standard theoretical framework in the rational choice tradition is developed by
Klandermans (1984) and Klandermans and Oegema (1987) who suggest that mobi-
lization constitutes a progression of steps from becoming informed towards even-
tual active participation – each step in between depending on a cost-benefit ratio-
nale of the potential activist. The authors divide this chain of decisions into distinct
sub-categories: First comes consensusmobilization, uponwhich subsequent action
mobilization depends. As the basis of mobilization, consensus-spreading efforts re-
quire an effective and widespread dissemination of information in order to involve
a large number of people with the SMO’s cause. Only afterwards can action mobi-
lization guide these individuals towards active participation, e.g. in demonstrations.
Similarly, Snow et al. (1986) refer to the first stage of SMO mobilization activities
as the process of frame alignment between an organization and individuals.
Within this general framework of the process, further research has sought more
specific insights into successful mobilization: To this end, a broad literature em-
phasizes the relevance of social networks – their size and structure being an in-
tegral factor for the proximity and scope of interaction between individuals and
an organization (see e.g. Rosenthal, Fingrutd, Ethier, Karant, & McDonald, 1985;
Fernandez & McAdam, 1988; McAdam & Paulsen, 1993; Passy, 2003). Network
centrality of actors in particular is found to be a strong predictor of inducing move-
ment participation (Marwell & Oliver, 1993; Kim & Bearman, 1997). While the
literature focused on traditional mobilization efforts examines only personal social
networks in the real world, the network-centric view translates easily to the virtual
realm and has thus been adopted bymore recent studies to analyze information flow
and collective action coordination online. Romero, Meeder, and Kleinberg (2011)
find support for the sociological complex contagion hypothesis in the spread of in-
formation, according to which more controversial topics require multiple sources
of contact before being adopted. González-Bailón, Borge-Holthoefer, Rivero, and
Moreno (2011) evaluate the impact of social media platforms on the diffusion of so-
cial protest and show that central individuals are more likely to initiate larger waves
of messages. Both studies rely on empirical data from Twitter as it has grown to be
a central hub for widespread and targeted communication.
Apart from network effects, online communication has also been researched
within the broader context of SMO mobilization. A number of studies have exam-
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ined more specifically the way SMOs mobilize followers through new media. The
majority of this line of research focuses on the opportunities that internet mobi-
lization affords to SMOs. For example, comparing online and offline mobilization,
Stein (2009) argues that the internet enables SMOs to mobilize followers “through
a combination of greater speed, lesser expense, further geographical reach and rel-
atively unlimited content capacity compared to older forms of print and electronic
media”. Similarly, Bimber (1998), Diani (2000) and Ward et al. (2003) suggest that
electronic communication reduces the cost of information diffusion, thus facilitat-
ingmobilization and leading to a broader political participation of society. Postmes
and Brunsting (2002) find that the internet’s relative ease of reaching broad au-
diences empowers organizations and movements. And Van Aelst and Walgrave
(2002) argue that the use of the internet furthermore levels the playing field between
organizations with different resource endowments. Changing the focus from the
opportunities of online mobilization to the identities of online followers, Krueger
(2006) adds to the literature by pointing out differences between online and con-
ventional offline mobilization of political parties and organizations. His findings
suggest that many longstanding and robust predictors for conventional mobiliza-
tion efforts (such as socio-economic traits of individuals) fail to predict who is ac-
tually mobilized online, whereas both political motivation and technical internet
skills prove to be strong predictors. While these studies all identify online commu-
nication as an increasingly utilized channel for mobilization activities, they view it
as just another medium in the communication portfolio of SMOs. But precisely
because the virtual space levels the playing field and reduces costs and distances, it
is not straightforward to assume that online mobilization is governed by the same
mechanisms as traditional mobilization channels. An exhaustive analysis of under-
lying processes and effective determinants of successful online mobilization activi-
ties is still missing. In this sense the analysis of online social networks is still inad-
equately connected to the original theory of SMO growth and mobilization (Stein,
2009).
In order to address this gap, this paper develops a modular approach to exam-
ine the determinants and mechanisms of online SMO mobilization based on data
sourced from Twitter. Theocharis, Lowe, Deth, and García-Albacete (2015) show
that Twitter is a widespread tool for online mobilization efforts, which is, however,
used primarily for discussions and the sharing of information – coordinated actions
are not the focus of this mobilization channel. This is in line with Vissers, Hooghe,
Stolle, and Mahéo (2012) who find clear medium-specific effects of mobilization:
Online activities produce further information sharing, while face-to-face contact
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is more likely to result in active, real-world participation. Returning to the tradi-
tional framework by Klandermans (1984) and Klandermans and Oegema (1987),
this suggests that online mobilization efforts should primarily be attributed to con-
sensusmobilization. This stage in the overall process requires reaching and commu-
nicating with a large number of potential and new activists in order to disseminate
information that can align them with an organization’s cause.
Success of mobilization is consequently operationalized in this paper in two dis-
tinct ways: (i) The number of people reached with a message can be measured by
its popularity. Messages that are retweeted more often are read and shared by more
potential followers of an SMO. (ii) In order to reach beyond the set of existing ac-
tivists, messages need to be read by people previously unconnected to an organiza-
tion. Therefore the distance a message travels through the communication network
helps assess its contribution to the mobilization efforts. Section 4.4.3 below offers
a detailed explanation as to how these measures are constructed from the Twitter
data.
In order to explain varying success of online mobilization activities, the early
social psychology literature already indicates that the content of communication
is essential. But for a more precise operationalization, this paper builds upon re-
search in communication theory that determines which properties of online com-
munication affect its dissemination: Stieglitz and Dang-Xuan (2013) find that the
tendency to share information on Twitter is positively influenced by the level of
emotions inherent in a message. Similarly, Hansen et al. (2011) study the link be-
tween the virality of messages and their capacity to evoke emotions. For messages
that represent news they find that negative sentiments increase the likelihood of vi-
ral dissemination. In order to assess the effect of message sentiment in the context
of SMO mobilization, one of the building blocks of the analysis below is therefore
an evaluation of message sentiment. Subsequently, its effect on the mobilization
success in terms of message popularity and reach can be estimated. Based on the
cited online communication research, negative sentiments should be more likely to
spread among a large number of people. While this obviously increases the chances
of a negativemessage reachingmore distant, previously unattached individuals, the
actual effect depends on the network topology. For example, highly clustered com-
munities might lead to messages cycling among the same set of closely connected
people.
This conditional effect already shows the need to consider networks in more
detail. As previous analyses of online communication such as González-Bailón et al.
(2011) andRomero et al. (2011) have demonstrated, a network perspective provides
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valuable insights and data from Twitter furthermore offer necessary information
to establish network structures. Since both analyses of online networks as well as
traditional studies of personal ties emphasize the importance of centrality for the
mobilization process, messages by central, well-connected individuals should reach
a larger number and more distant people.
Taken together, this paper argues that in order to understand the mechanisms
of online mobilization activities, two dimensions are important: First, emotional
characteristics of the message spread via social media, and second, the network
topology or characteristics of the individual messenger who spreads information.
Both aspects are incorporated in a general framework in order to be able to estimate
their concurrent effects within the mobilization process.
4.3 Data
The empirical approach presented in this paper is demonstrated by application to
two movements: the environmental and the nuclear disarmamentmovement. Both
are chosen to be sufficiently distinct, so as not to exhibit any overlap in their network
members, while also representing large and well-established social movements that
encompass multiple active organizations. In order to analyze the online mobiliza-
tion efforts of specific SMOs, this paper selects six organizations from these move-
ments. For the selection of the individual organizations, a first and more practice-
driven requirement is that all organizations be active on Twitter, as this social me-
dia platform is widely-used by different kinds of organizations and thus a rich data
source for the subsequent analysis. All organizations also need to be predominantly
English-speaking in order to be able to conduct a computational content analysis of
the collected communication data: The bulk of dictionaries used for this purpose is
only available in English and comparisons across different languages are still not suf-
ficiently researched. Apart from these requirements, the distinct SMOs are selected
to represent a diverse array of organizations along several dimensions within each
movement: First, they differ in their respective age. While long-standing organiza-
tionswith several decades of experiencewould seem to be at an advantage regarding
the dissemination of information and the expansion of their networks, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that young and recently-founded SMOsmay bemore focused on
the use of social media. Second, the organizational structure and method of opera-
tion differs among the selected cases. It ranges from organizations solely working
on a national level to thoroughly international ones that in turn rely on local chap-
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ters. Third, the SMOs differ in their resource endowments – measured by the latest
available data on net assets – as it determines the potential scope of mobilization
efforts. Table 4.1 gives an overview of these properties for the selected SMOs.
Including an array of diverse organizations in each movement helps ensure the
robustness of results derived from their online communication. The dataset thus
provides insights that can be generalized within each movement. Additionally, by
using multiple movements, the analysis gains a comparative dimension to further-
more point out general mechanisms that are valid irrespective of the movement or
reveal fundamental differences between them.
Table 4.1: Properties of selected SMOs
Organization Twitter Name Founded Net Assets Structure
Environmental Movement
Environmental
Defense Fund
@EnvDefenseFund 1967 $ 211 527 199 US-based,
international
Conservation
International
@ConservationOrg 1987 $ 199 204 000 US-based,
international
Citizens
Climate Lobby
@citizensclimate 2007 $ 44 457 US-based, local
chapters
worldwide
Nuclear Disarmament Movement
Campaign for
Nuclear
Disarmament
@CNDuk 1957 £ 671 964 UK-based,
national and
local
Nuclear Age
Peace
Foundation
@napf 1982 $ 4 368 849 US-based,
international
Global Zero @globalzero 2008 $ 616 672 International
initiative, local
chapters
4.3.1 Creating the Dataset
This section describes the approach taken to create the dataset for the subsequent
analysis. It is compiled using Twitter’s freely accessible RESTful API, which allows
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for retrieving tweets (also called statuses) either from a specified user or simply
based on search terms. In order to collect only those tweets that belong to an ex-
tended network of each selected SMO, it is necessary to apply a method that identi-
fies and extracts them from the plethora of messages on Twitter. This can be accom-
plished by using the hashtags that each SMO has used to put their messages into a
specific context, thus letting the organizations themselves define which tweets are
relevant. From the set of tweets taken from each official SMO account a setH of the
100 most frequently used hashtags is extracted and serves as a collection of search
terms to find other tweets that have taken part in these conversations.1 Those con-
stitute the set of tweetsS belonging to the extended SMOnetwork; each single tweet
s contains at least one hashtag hi 2 H .2
H = fh1; h2; : : : ; h100g (4.1)
S = fs : 9hi 2 sg i = 1; :::; 100 (4.2)
In order to be able to construct an organizational communication network from
the plain set of tweets, its elemental structure, i.e. the building blocks of the network,
needs to be defined. Based on the information the dataset contains, it seems natural
to think of users as the nodes of the network. The contents as well as the number
of their tweets will then help define the role of each node. Some individuals might
for example serve as distributory information hubs, while others generate original
information or participate only in discussions on very specific topics.
Deciding on how to connect the nodes to one another requires slightly more at-
tention. Even though Twitter users effectively constitute a network based on their
friendship and follower relations, Huberman, Romero, andWu (2008) demonstrate
that links between individual users based these relationships tend to be superficial
and do not necessarily reflect any type of joint interest or reciprocated commu-
nication. Following someone with a click of a button is cheap and does not lend
the relationship any meaning yet (Cha, Haddadi, Benevenuto, & Gummadi, 2010).
Therefore, such relationships would vastly overstate the extent and the density of
the network. Previous studies, e.g. by Romero et al. (2011) and Tan et al. (2011),
use a more suitable approach to work out the “hidden social network” (Huberman
et al., 2008). Two users are only connected if they engage in active communication:
1Currently, the API returns up to 3200 tweets per search. Using all 100 key hashtags each SMO
network could thus consist of a maximum of 320 000 tweets.
2A separate subscript denoting the SMO is omitted in this exposition in order to preserve legi-
bility.
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either a user includes someone else’s name in a tweet, which is called amention and
requires adding “@username” to the body of a message; or a user retweets some-
body else’s message (which can be identified via the addition of “RT @username:”
at the start of the tweet). In the former case, the link points from the tweeting user
to the person being mentioned; in the latter, it points towards the retweeter. This
way the directed relationships depict the flow of information across the network.
Another useful benefit gained from constructing links in the network based on
mentions and retweets is a higher level of detailed information about the relation-
ships: Every time two users engage in direct communication another link is added
to the network, uniquely identified by the timestamp of the tweet and its key hash-
tag. So instead of only knowing whether or not two members of the network are
connected, the network also provides insights on the frequency of their contact, the
exact point in time and the topic over which this relationship was established.
Formally, the dataset of tweets and their respective authors is translated into a
directedmultigraph of the set of nodes V , representing all users of the network, and
the multiset of ordered pairs of nodes A:
G := (V;A) with A = famntg; (4.3)
wherem;n = 1; : : : ;M uniquely identifies the users asM = kV k and t = 0; :::; T
denotes the discrete point in time at which a tweet has been created. Multiple arcs
between two nodes are allowed as each communication between them establishes
a new link. The adjacency matrix A is therefore a three-dimensional array of size
M M  T .
4.3.2 Data & Network Description
The data for all six SMOs amount to a total of 867 106 tweets from 449 169 users
andwere collected on 24 and 25 June 2014. As table 4.2 shows, the number of tweets
varies across the different SMO networks between 1:24105 and 1:75105 which
translates into 1:79 to 2:07 tweets per user.
The size and structure of the resulting network graphs are outlined in table 4.3.
All extended SMO networks have approximately the same size with respect to their
diameter and the variance in their number of nodes and edges is proportional to the
number of collected tweets. Generally, a similar number of tweets across the orga-
nizational networks could be attributed to the limits of the Twitter API; but as table
4.2 shows, the theoretical maximum of 320 000 tweets has not been encountered
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for any of the organizations. Therefore, the differences in the number of nodes and
edges do suggest a larger set of active users in the networks of theNuclear Age Peace
Foundation and Global Zero (at least during the time period covered by the data).
At the same time, their networks also show a slightly lower density than the others,
coupled with a lower average tie strength. This suggests that while both organiza-
tions are part of larger extended networks, their users exhibit looser relationships.
By contrast, the oldest organizations in both movements, Environmental Defense
Fund and Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, belong to networks with the highest
density, so a larger share of all possible connections between users in these networks
is being actively used to share and disseminate information. The network of Con-
servation International exhibits the highest average tie strength: Those members of
the network that communicate with one another do so more often than members
of the other networks.
Beyond information on the overall network structure, table 4.3 also points out
differences between the organizations with respect to their own network integra-
tion. The degree of the SMO nodes is a measure for the sum of inward and outward
links to other members of the network. Among the anti-nuclear SMOs it is the old-
est one, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, that maintains by far the most direct
connections; while Global Zero, who has only been founded in the year 2008, has
the fewest. In the environmental movement, however, these roles are almost re-
versed: The oldest SMO, Environmental Defense Fund, exhibits the smallest degree,
whereas the longer-established Conservation International as well as the young Cit-
izens Climate Lobby are similarly well connected.
More generally, the data also show that within each movement the individual
organizational networks strongly overlap. This does not come as a surprise since
their purposes are closely aligned despite their different focuses. The networks con-
structed from the Twitter data are, however, also helpful in showing how closely
different SMOs are connected within the broader network of their movement. In
the environmental movement, at most two edges separate the SMOs from one an-
other. In the nuclear disarmament movement, the SMOs are all just one edge apart
and thus directly connected through active communication.
4.4 Analysis
The collected data provide detailed insight into the communication structure and
flowof informationwithin both socialmovements. As outlined in section 4.2 above,
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Table 4.2: Data summary statistics per organization
Organization #Tweets #Users min(#Tweets) max(#Tweets) var(#Tweets)
EnvDefenseFund 123 921 59 955 1 750 59.86
ConservationOrg 143 266 72 002 1 1133 67.58
citizensclimate 131 270 65 291 1 750 56.26
CNDuk 123 593 63 437 1 467 31.99
napf 170 014 90 790 1 617 40.27
globalzero 175 042 97 694 1 1313 49.02
Table 4.3: Graph summary statistics
Organization #Nodes #Edges Density Tie Diameter Degree
Strength (SMO)
EnvDefenseFund 59 896 101 139 1.810−5 3.38 25 1078
ConservationOrg 67 742 130 596 1.610−5 3.86 24 3293
citizensclimate 66 419 123 069 1.610−5 3.71 23 2835
CNDuk 62 042 110 893 1.810−5 3.57 27 4120
napf 86 043 140 531 1.210−5 3.27 27 3147
globalzero 92 711 140 263 1.010−5 3.03 26 1892
Note: Density is the ratio of the number of observed edges and the number of possible edges. Tie Strength denotes the
average weighted degree of nodes within each network.
two dimensions are important to comprehend the mechanisms of online mobiliza-
tion activities by SMOs: the sentiment of messages spread via social media, as well
as the network topology. In order to empirically examine this proposition, this pa-
per combines two methodological approaches within a general framwork. First, to
study the influence of message content on SMOmobilization, this section performs
a sentiment analysis of all tweets. To study how network topology determines SMO
mobilization, this section then calculates network metrics for each active user and
maps them to the set of tweets. Finally, these results are used to disentangle the flow
of information within the movements and explain its dissemination as a means of
consensus mobilization.
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4.4.1 Sentiment Analysis
The large size of the dataset lends itself to a computational approach for a senti-
ment analysis of each tweet. In that regard, Grimmer and Stewart (2013) provide an
extensive account of the current methods, possibilities and limitations of modern
text analysis. Furthermore, Schwartz and Ungar (2015) offer an up-to-date review
of automated content analysis of social media. Since applying a machine learning
method is beyond the scope of this paper, the analysis follows a lexicon-based ap-
proach to assess the sentiments of tweets.
There are a number of widely used dictionaries available for this purpose and
each one has its preferred area of application. As the dataset of tweets represents a
rather large body of text from a high number of different authors lacking a specific
domain or unified terminology, an appropriate dictionary should (i) cover a broad
set of words, (ii) offer a sentiment scaling beyond a dichotomous measure and (iii)
preserve some of the variance by using a multi-dimensional concept of sentiments.
Such a dictionary also helps preserve the “natural ambiguity” of language which lets
individuals perceive words in different ways (Andreevskaia & Bergler, 2006).
This paper therefore uses an updated version of the ANEWdictionary provided
byWarriner, Kuperman, and Brysbaert (2013) that heavily extends the original dic-
tionary by Bradley and Lang (1999) to include almost 14 000 English words and
their affective scores in the three dimensions “valence”, “arousal” and “dominance”.
These are based on the theory of emotions put forth by Osgood, Suci, and Tannen-
baum (1957). The extented ANEW dictionary (xANEW) was created using Ama-
zon’s Mechanical Turk platform and belongs to the category of crowdsourced dic-
tionaries. While such a dictionary only encompasses a closed vocabulary and is
not derived from the data it is applied to, it is less susceptible to bias and oversight
(Schwartz & Ungar, 2015).
Furthermore, its scores reflect a reader’s perception of words (Young & Soroka,
2012). This is beneficial to the purpose of the analysis, examining the way mem-
bers of the networks perceive the flow of information. In each dimension the score
is rated on a continuous scale from 1 to 9, low values of which correspond to un-
happy/calm/submissive and high ones to happy/excited/in control. For an easier
interpretation they are rescaled to the closed interval [ 1; 1].
The sentiment scores for all tweets are calculated as follows: Each entry in dic-
tionary D is mapped to a tupel of affective scores (v(); a(); d()). In order to de-
termine the sentiment of a tweet sj , only the intersection s^j = sj \ D of all words
found in the dictionary is relevant. Then their average affective scores are given by
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of affect scores across movements
the vector
(sj) =
1
K
KX
k=1
0@v(s^jk)a(s^jk)
d(s^jk)
1A ; (4.4)
whereK = ks^jk denotes the number of matched words in any given tweet.
The resulting distribution of affects identified in all tweets is shown in figure 4.1
for both movements. Except for minor kinks in the densities, both movements ex-
hibit the same distribution of affects. This is not an unexpected finding: Due to the
large number of messages used for the sentiment analysis, the set of words closely
resembles the dictionary itself and the underlying affects approach the distribution
of affects within the entire dictionary (see Warriner et al., 2013). While this plain
distribution of affects does not show differences between both movements, it is not
suited to evaluate the use and prevalence of affective language within the networks
of communication. For this purpose the next section will include a measure of net-
work structure.
But first, in order to ensure the validity of these affect values, a complemen-
tary sentiment analysis using other dictionaries should be performed. Employing
the Syuzhet-package for the R environment by Jockers (2015), which incorporates
three different dictionaries (Bing (Hu & Liu, 2004), AFINN (Nielsen, 2011) and
NRC (Mohammad & Turney, 2013)), as well as using the Lexicoder Sentiment Dic-
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Table 4.4: Correlation coefficients for valence scores across dictionaries
xANEW Bing AFINN NRC
Bing 0.5383
AFINN 0.5214 0.7016
NRC 0.5170 0.5201 0.4808
LSD 0.5510 0.6767 0.6641 0.5310
Note: N = 764 194 for the first column andN = 867 106 otherwise. All correlations are significant at p < 0:001.
tionary (LSD) recently developed and tested by Young and Soroka (2012) provides
sufficient data to validate the scores delivered by the xANEW. Since all of these sup-
plementary dictionaries only include ameasurement of valence in text, the compar-
ison is confined to this dimension.
As Table 4.4 shows, all five dictionaries yield valence scores that are pairwise
moderately or even strongly correlated. Since each dictionary is built to serve a
slightly different purpose (e.g. being applied to a specific domainwith a given termi-
nology), absence of a perfect correlation is not suprising. Young and Soroka (2012)
observe very similar values to those in table 4.4 in their comparison across auto-
mated dictionaries. More importantly, with its broad scope the xANEW exhibits
similarities with measures from all other dictionaries, suggesting that it is a suit-
able option to quantify the sentiment of the large number of tweets from different
authors.
4.4.2 Including Network Structure
The second module of the approach presented in this paper includes the topology
of the communication network to examine the way it determines the effectiveness
of SMOmobilization in social media. As with the role of individuals in traditional
mobilization efforts, some users of a virtual network can be expected to be more
influential or at least more vocal than others. Thus, their messages – and the sen-
timents they convey – would be more prevalent and dominate the overall network
sentiment. In order to evaluate online mobilization, these diverse roles of users
need to be accounted for and messages should be weighted according to the impor-
tance of their author in the network.
Differentiation between individual members of the network according to their
potential prevalence and visibility requires some measure of centrality that reflects
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and characterizes their role. As this analysis focuses on the mechanisms of commu-
nication and information dissemination within directed SMO networks, centrality
of users is expressed by their normalized betweenness centrality.3 It measures how
often a given node is exposed to a message traversing the network on the shortest
possible path between two randomly chosen nodes. If the node of interest is lo-
cated on a large number of shortest paths, it effectively serves as a distributory hub
providing information to different parts and (possibly remote) user groups of the
network.
To illustrate the effect of accounting for network centrality, figure 4.2 oncemore
depicts the distribution of affects found in the tweets of each movement; this time,
however, each tweet is weighted according to the betweenness centrality of its orig-
inal author.⁴ In contrast to the unweighted version, this results in a multimodal
distribution with distinct spikes at the dominant levels in each affective dimension.
The bimodal distribution of valence scores in the environmental movement makes
this especially clear; but since the modes do not lie on opposite sides of the scale’s
midpoint at zero, they do not so much depict a split between conflictive sentiments
but rather usage of either fairly neutral or very happy words.
Arousal Dominance Valence
0
2
4
6
0
2
4
6
En
viro
n
m
ent
N
uclear Disarm
am
ent
−0.5 0.0 0.5 −0.5 0.0 0.5 −0.5 0.0 0.5
Score
D
en
si
ty
Figure 4.2: Distribution of betweenness-weighted affect scores across movements
3All betweenness values of an SMO network are normalized according to ~bi = bi b
min
bmax bmin .
⁴For ordinary tweets, the original author is the sender; for retweets the centrality of the person
being retweeted is used.
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4.4.3 Information Flow Models
Using the modules developed and outlined above, this section combines them in
a general framework that estimates the impact of the message (the sentiment mea-
sures) as well as of the messenger (the network centrality) on the effectiveness of
SMO social media mobilization. In general, mobilization efforts aim at reaching
and communicating with as many potential and new activists as possible. This
reflects two dimensions of mobilization that need to be taken into account: In-
formation not only needs to be disseminated effectively among existing members
but must also speak to individuals who are so far unconnected to an SMO. Conse-
quently, this paper operationalizes mobilization success in two distinct ways as (i)
the popularity of messages as well as (ii) their reach, i.e. the distance of dissemina-
tion throughout the networks.
Message Popularity
In order to explain the popularity of amessagewithin the network, Twitter offers the
unique possibility to track the number of times a single tweet is forwarded by other
users. Thus the first operationalization of SMO social media mobilization is the
number of retweets of amessage. For each tweet sj the dataset contains information
on how often it has been retweeted at the time of data retrieval. Unfortunately, the
way the Twitter API returns search results poses a challenge to using this raw data as
a dependent variable: Since the largest part of tweets in the dataset has been created
within two days before the query, retweet counts are very likely right-censored. Not
enough time had passed when the data was retrieved to confidently assume the
given retweet count to be sufficiently close to its final value. As a result, the number
of zero counts is highly inflated and any estimated effects of sentiment and network
topology on popularity would be biased. In order to resolve this issue, the counts for
all relevant tweets have been updated in an additional query to the TwitterAPImore
than three months after the initial data collection. Due to tweets being generally
short-lived messages, it seems reasonable to assume this updated count to persist.
Identifying the retweet count as c(sj) = cj , the stylized model to be estimated
is
cj =  + 
0
(sj) + ~b(!j) + "j; (4.5)
where (sj) is a vector of affect scores, !j is the original author of a given tweet sj
and ~b(!j) is her normalized betweenness centrality in the network.
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Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics of variables
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Environment
Retweet Count 35.95 927.94 0.00 123 494.00
Valence 0.18 0.24 −0.90 0.88
Arousal −0.18 0.16 −0.76 0.70
Dominance 0.14 0.16 −0.83 0.72
Betweenness 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00
Nuclear Disarmament
Retweet Count 53.35 1145.03 0.00 144 181.00
Valence 0.20 0.21 −0.88 0.88
Arousal −0.20 0.14 −0.71 0.70
Dominance 0.14 0.15 −0.72 0.72
Betweenness 0.04 0.18 0.00 1.00
Descriptive statistics of the data are shown in table 4.5. A first glance at the
mean and standard deviation of retweet counts in both movements already sug-
gests that a simple Poisson model for estimating them is not appropriate as the data
does not conform with its strict equidispersion requirement.⁵ Using a negative bi-
nomial (NegBin) model presents an appropriate method to accomodate overdis-
persion (Zeileis, Kleiber, & Jackman, 2008). As the set of information criteria listed
in table 4.6 clearly shows, the NegBin model improves the fit immensely, as it can
handle the overdispersed counts. Additionally, however, the data still exhibit an
inflated number of zero counts that would not be expected from a Poisson or Neg-
Bin model. In this case it is common to either specify a zero-inflated or a hurdle
model, both of which are discussed in detail by Cameron and Trivedi (2013) and
Zeileis et al. (2008). Both types of models consist of two components, one part to
model zero counts and a count part for positive observations. Despite their similar
approaches, the hurdle model is more appropriate based on the information crite-
ria in table 4.6. The zero-inflated model assumes two sources of zeros whereas the
hurdle model uses a truncated count component to strictly separate both kinds of
realizations. Since all observations in the dataset of tweets underly the same pro-
⁵A more formal test is fitting a Quasi-Poisson model and estimating a dispersion parameter in
the networks of both movements. This yields parameters of 1:65  104 and 2:39  104 and thus
clearly shows the need to account for the overdispersed data.
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Table 4.6: Retweet count models: Information criteria
Pois NegBin Zinb Hurdle
Environment
k 5 6 11 11
lnL −18 074 367 −229 230 −229 231 −214 383
AIC 36 148 743 458 474 458 484 428 789
BIC 36 148 790 458 530 458 586 428 891
Nuclear Disarmament
k 5 6 11 11
lnL −13 005 524 −224 925 −224 904 −213 210
AIC 26 011 058 449 863 449 829 426 442
BIC 26 011 105 449 919 449 932 426 545
cess, there cannot be a second source for zero counts – messages are either passed
on or not. Thus the hurdle model (using a negative binomial distribution) is chosen
to estimate the determinants of a tweet’s popularity.
Table 4.7 contains the regression results for both movements. The estimated co-
efficients in the zero model show the influence of affects and network centrality on
the likelihood of a message receiving at least one retweet. Positive coefficients im-
ply that higher values of the respective variable increase the likelihood of a retweet
and thus of crossing the hurdle. The environmental and the anti-nuclearmovement
show entirely differential preferences governing the initial retweet of messages: In
line with theory on traditional mobilization efforts, a central network position is
beneficial in the environmental movement to being noticed at all. This is not the
case, however, for the anti-nuclear movement, in which a high betweenness cen-
trality decreases the likelihood of a retweet. It seems that among members of the
anti-nuclear movement’s network decentral users may stir up attention while cen-
tral actors provide information that is only being absorbed. With regard to the
affects conveyed in a message, the anti-nuclear movement only favours unhappy
sentiments. In contrast, while the valence dimension shows no significant effect
in the environmental movement, excited as well as submissive messages are more
likely to be passed on.
Moving to the count part of the hurdlemodel, the factors contributing to a wide-
spread popularity of a givenmessage are the same for bothmovements: Contrary to
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Table 4.7: Retweet counts: Negative binomial hurdle model
Environment Nuclear
Disarmament
Zero-Stage
(Intercept) 0.69 (0.01) 0.54 (0.01)
Betweenness 0.10 (0.04) −0.20 (0.04)
Valence −0.05 (0.05) −0.43 (0.05)
Arousal 0.16 (0.05) 0.07 (0.05)
Dominance −0.66 (0.07) 0.00 (0.07)
Count-Stage
(Intercept) −12.22 (33.43) −11.68 (22.33)
Betweenness −2.54 (0.05) −3.25 (0.05)
Valence 1.03 (0.05) 2.42 (0.07)
Arousal 0.87 (0.07) 0.40 (0.08)
Dominance −1.23 (0.08) −1.47 (0.11)
Log(theta) −18.40 (33.43) −17.31 (22.33)
AIC 428 789 426 442
Log Likelihood −214 383 −213 210
Num. obs. 83 689 82 801
p< .05; p< .01; p< .001
expectations formed by research on traditional mobilization, the centrality of an au-
thor in the organizational network is not conducive to her message being noticed
and passed on by many others. In both movements the estimated coefficient for
the effect of centrality is highly significant and negative. Among the affects of mes-
sages, valence as well as dominance both have large and significant effects: High
valence scores (i.e. words such as “honest”, “love” or “joy”) increase the expected
retweet count, especially in the nuclear disarmament movement, where the effect
is more pronounced. At the same time a low dominance score (from words like
“earthquake”, “catastrophic” or “doom”) makes a message more popular. Arousal
also exhibits a positive, though slightly smaller effect in both movements.
Taken together, the two stages of the model depict a consistent behaviour of
the environmental network. A happy, excited and/or submissive message, possibly
sent by a central member of the network, is more likely to pass the hurdle and re-
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ceive a lot of attention. By contrast, the nuclear disarmament movement network
seems slightly inconsistent: Only unhappy messages tend to have a higher chance
of passing the hurdle and centrality is harmful. But in order to reach a large num-
ber of networkmembers, the message content should be happy. In conclusion, only
excited and/or submissive messages from non-central members are more likely to
gain widespread attention – whether or not they pass the hurdle, however, seems
to follow no clear mechanism.
Common to both movement networks is the lack of importance of the mes-
senger; it is rather the content of a message that affects its widespread popularity.
Happy, excited or submissive sentiments will generally reach a larger audience.
Distance of Dissemination
Not only should SMOs be interested in crafting popular messages that reach a large
number of potential activists; it should be similarly important whether a message
has the capacity to extend their network and reach individuals who have not di-
rectly been in touch with them before. Therefore, the second operationalization
of a successful social media mobilization strategy is the dissemination distance of
tweets.
So instead of purely focusing on the bare number of readers, this approach con-
siders their respective distances based on the network structure that results from
the dataset. This effectively determines how far tweets travel across the network
until they get adopted by another user. Unlike the retweet count there is no readily
available measure for this purpose and it needs to be constructed. Two difficulties
arise from this task: First, not every tweet can be used to measure distances since
themajority of themmaywell be read, but without any kind of reaction or reference
there is no way of knowing about it. This part of the analysis is therefore restricted
to retweets as they are, by definition, a user’s reaction to an original tweet and thus
identify the two nodes involved. The set of retweets is a subset of all tweets,R ( S,
and for each retweet rj 2 R its original author and the user reacting to it are de-
noted by !(rj) = !j and (rj) = j , respectively.
Focussing only on tweets in R directly leads to the second difficulty: By con-
struction the networks exhibit a link between two nodes if one of them retweets the
other’s message. Determining their distance would thus always result in the find-
ing that they are in fact neighbours and thus only one edge apart. For this reason
distances are not measured within a static network built from the entire dataset of
tweets; instead information from the three-dimensional adjacency array is used in
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order to determine the distances between two nodes up to the point in time when
the given retweet established a new edge. This is possible by constructing edge-
induced subgraphs based on the time (rj) = j of each retweet:
Gj(V;Aj) with Aj = famnt : t < jg; 8rj 2 R (4.6)
In each subgraph the geodesic distance (!j; j) between the two nodes in-
volved describes the number of edges along the shortest path connecting them
(Bouttier, Di Francesco, & Guitter, 2003). In order to find the shortest path, the
Dijkstra algorithm is used (Dijkstra, 1959).⁶ Defined in this way, however, the mea-
sure of mobilization success would end up being a zero-truncated variable since
the number of edges between two distinct nodes must by definition at least be one.
Without accounting for this circumstance, any parameter estimations would be in-
consistent (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013; Gurmu, 1991). This is easily mitigated by
slightly re-defining the distance to measure the number of edges beyond all direct
neighbours, 1(!j; j) = (!j; j)  1.
If two nodes are not connected, their distance is infinity by convention. Even
though it would be of great interest to identify messages that are creating new links
between previously unconnected nodes within the networks, these observations
are excluded from the analysis because the dataset does not permit distinguishing
between truly new connections and those that simply do not exist in the sample
snapshot in time.⁷
A last thing to consider carefully are observations from an early point in time
among the sample tweets. They require the overall graph to be reduced extensively
since only a small fraction of all edges is established by then. In such a subgraph
measures of centrality are much more polarized, resulting in outliers in the data
and biased estimations. Furthermore distances between nodes are more likely to be
overestimated on account of the limited amount of data. A burn-in period during
which the network is constructed can handle these challanges appropriately. There-
fore only observations that were made after the graph exhibits at least 25 percent of
its maximum size enter the subsequent empirical analysis.⁸
⁶In spite of the graph’s directedness, this calculation neglects the direction of edges to avoid
inflating the distance due to the timewise limited sample.
⁷Using a broader sample of tweets by gathering data over the course of several months might
mitigate this problem (see e.g. Romero et al. (2011) for applications of such large-scale datasets).
⁸The length of burn-in periods often seems to be determined haphazardly – usually some round
number is chosen. In order to avoid this impression and to put the choice on a methodologically
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The stylized model fitted to estimate the influence of affects (rj) as well as net-
work centrality measures (!j) on the maximum distance a message might travel
through the network is as follows:
1(!j; j) =  + 
0
(rj) + 
0
(!j) + "j (4.7)
As before, the data exhibit overdispersion and added zeros, so a negative bi-
nomial hurdle model as well as ZINB again seem appropriate. Both models lead
to very similar estimated coefficients and the same qualitative results, however this
time, the overall likelihood of the ZINBmodel is slightly higher. The interpretation
of the ZINB with two concurrent sources of zeros is also more suited for the lim-
ited dataset used here: Part of the zero observations indicate that a given tweet has
disseminated only within the confines of the author’s neighbourhood. But some
zero observations may stem from the fact that another user who passed on that
message is just not part of the sample. The estimation results are presented in table
4.8 (table 4.9 in the appendix summarises the estimations of the hurdle model for
completeness).
Two measures of centrality are included in the model: As before, a node’s be-
tweenness centrality measures its importance and influence in the network. But
since each observation originates from its own edge-induced subgraph, it is also
necessary to control for the varying network sizes. Therefore the relative degree is a
version of the standard (in- and outward) degree centrality, normalized by the total
number of edges present in the respective subgraph and thus confining themeasure
to the unit interval.
The zero stage of themodel represents the publicity of amessenger and hermes-
sage. In contrast to the hurdle model, the ZINB estimates the probability of observ-
ing a zero count. Thus the large and negative coefficient for a node’s betweenness
centrality indicates that a central actor is much more likely to reach other mem-
bers of the network beyond her immediate neighbourhood. This is the case in both
movements and clearly dominates the effects of message affects. As a counterbal-
ance a high relative degree increases the probability of messages staying among di-
rect neighbours. This is in line with expectations, since a higher relative degree
means that the individual is directly connected to a larger set of other network
sound basis, the analysis was runwith different levels of burn-in periods from2% to 50%. The results
revealed no common threshold below which outliers bias the results – the exact length of the burn-
in does not matter. Therefore a value was chosen that ensures a reasonably large network while still
maintaining a sufficiently large number of observations.
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Table 4.8: Retweet distances: Zero-inflated negative binomial model
Environment Nuclear
Disarmament
Zero-Stage
(Intercept) −0.03 (0.03) −0.08 (0.03)
Betweenness −30.37 (2.36) −36.86 (3.95)
Relative Degree 103.17 (8.20) 136.43 (13.41)
Valence 0.46 (0.11) 1.54 (0.13)
Arousal 0.30 (0.12) 0.31 (0.12)
Dominance 0.53 (0.15) −0.77 (0.18)
Count-Stage
(Intercept) 1.16 (0.01) 1.15 (0.02)
Betweenness −1.60 (0.19) −2.28 (0.32)
Relative Degree −8.96 (2.47) −0.08 (2.98)
Valence −0.05 (0.05) −0.09 (0.07)
Arousal 0.17 (0.06) −0.03 (0.06)
Dominance 0.10 (0.07) 0.13 (0.10)
Log(theta) 2.47 (0.09) 1.23 (0.05)
AIC 59 571 54 703
Log Likelihood −29 772 −27 338
Num. obs. 19 340 17 196
p< .05; p< .01; p< .001
members. It should therefore become more unlikely to reach users beyond the di-
rect neighbourhood. In both movements, unhappy messages are more likely to be
disseminated further. The only difference shows up in the dominance dimension:
While members of the anti-nuclear movement tend to respond to high dominance
scores, the environmentalmovement prefers a submissive tone, which is in linewith
the results from the first model.
In the count stage of themodel both centralitymeasures decrease the likelihood
of reaching distant members of the network. However, with respect to content only
the environmental movement appears to provide a systematic method to successful
widespread dissemination, as more excitedmessages turn out to be read and passed
on bymore distant individuals. In the nuclear disarmamentmovement, none of the
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affect measures have any significant effect. Instead, potential members of nuclear-
disarmament organizations rely entirely on the status of amessenger when deciding
whether or not to connect. This may be a consequence of the slightly more complex
and insular issue SMOs in this movement are concerned with in comparison to the
broader environmental causes.
Overall, sentiments only seem to be helpful to lift message dissemination above
the threshold of the direct neighbourhood. However, their effect is vastly domi-
nated by a high betweenness centrality, which is in line with results from studies
on traditional mobilization via personal networks (e.g. Snow, Zurcher, & Ekland-
Olson, 1980; McAdam, 1986). So in order to mobilize previously unconnected
members of an extended network, the messenger seems to be more important than
the message. But status does not carry a message very far as the positive effect of
centrality quickly vanishes beyond the immediate neighbourhood. A sound mobi-
lization strategy would thus target other well-connected individuals that are scat-
tered throughout the network and let them serve as dissemination hubs for a more
distant reach.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper investigated the determinants of success of SMO social media mobiliza-
tion strategies. Reviewing recent work on how SMOs operate online, it argued that
while the internet is increasingly in the focus of social sciences research on SMOs,
most studies have examined the new opportunities online campaigns offer, but few
have actually investigated the precisemechanisms through which SMOsmobilize in
socialmedia. Building onprevious research in social psychology and social network
analysis, this paper argued that for SMOs to successfully mobilize in social media,
characteristics of the message as well as of the messenger are both vital. This argu-
ment was empirically investigated in a novel dataset of 867 106 tweets of six SMO
networks in the environmental and nuclear disarmament movement that were cho-
sen to demonstrate the presented approach. The success of SMO mobilization in
social media was operationalized with two variables – (i) the popularity ofmessages
and (ii) the distance of their dissemination throughout the networks – while char-
acteristics of themessage and themessenger were studied by constructing measures
of tweet sentiments and network topology.
Using a combination of sentiment analysis and graph theory, the empirical anal-
ysis showed that messenger characteristics are barely beneficial at all when opera-
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tionalizing SMOmobilization via the popularity of messages – rather the sentiment
of messages determines their popularity. On the other hand, measuring the success
of mobilization as the dissemination distance of messages, messenger centrality is
essential to reaching distant network members. These results suggest a more dif-
ferentiated view on online mobilization efforts that distinguishes between specific
targets and goals of a given campaign. In order to stir lots of attention for an is-
sue, highly sentiment-laden messages are quite suitable and the messenger is only
secondary. However, even in times of instant information and high connectedness,
it is not straightforward to mobilize entirely new groups of people and the use of
strategic hubs becomesmore important than themessage itself. In this respect, trust
between existing and potential activists is still an essential part of the mobilization
process and the transition from personal to virtual networks has not changed this
condition.
This paper demonstrated a modular approach to harvest and utilize some of the
vast amounts of information generated and disseminatedwithin social networks. In
this respect it also contributes to the growing field of computational social sciences.
The approach also opens up avenues for future research to help overcome present
limitations: For one, more sophisticatedmethods can be applied to analyze the con-
tent of messages. Instead of dictionary-based sentiment measures, machine learn-
ing techniques may be able to increase the explanatory power of content-related
variables by assessing sentiments of complex phrases and distinguishing between
different topics. Also, even though the introduced dataset is large in comparison
to previous studies on social movements, the construction of exhaustive networks
may require an even larger amount of information. Future efforts could improve on
this by collecting data over longer time periods and by comparing a larger number
of organizations and movements to one another. The presented modular approach
allows for such methodological improvements and offers a general framework to
further study the mechanisms of online mobilization.
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Appendix
4.A Retweet Distances (Alternative Specification)
Table 4.9: Retweet distances: Negative binomial hurdle model
Environment Nuclear
Disarmament
Zero-Stage
(Intercept) −0.07 (0.03) −0.15 (0.02)
Betweenness 3.53 (0.38) 6.82 (0.81)
Relative Degree −46.50 (4.63) −54.27 (6.53)
Valence −0.42 (0.10) −1.41 (0.11)
Arousal −0.24 (0.11) −0.27 (0.10)
Dominance −0.44 (0.14) 0.80 (0.16)
Count-Stage
(Intercept) 1.16 (0.01) 1.16 (0.02)
Betweenness −0.85 (0.21) −2.15 (0.41)
Relative Degree −7.33 (2.56) −0.69 (3.51)
Valence −0.05 (0.05) −0.09 (0.07)
Arousal 0.17 (0.05) −0.04 (0.06)
Dominance 0.09 (0.07) 0.13 (0.10)
Log(theta) 2.54 (0.09) 1.24 (0.05)
AIC 59 777 54 887
Log Likelihood −29 875 −27 430
Num. obs. 19 340 17 196
p< .05; p< .01; p< .001
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